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Abstract
Behavioural factors play an important and crucial role in determining the
intensity of the self-initiated pre-cautionary health protective actions and the
success of a voluntary vaccination programme for infectious diseases. The
individual-level of decision making on whether or not to adopt altered be-
haviour in reducing the risk of infection as well as to opt for vaccination in
getting the vaccine-induced immunity is usually based on simple cost-benefit
considerations, which could be incorporated into epidemic models through
game-theoretical approaches. In this thesis, three different models addressing
these two types of behavioural changes are constructed through the replicator
dynamical equations, the vaccination population games framework and the
asymmetric smoothed best response function, respectively.
By using a multi-population replicator dynamical equation framework,
the first model focuses on the altered and normal behaviours of strategy in-
teractions between two subpopulations with different preferences and relative
strengths. Without imitations, the strategy switching is only minimal in nat-
ural selection process. With imitations, the strategy distributions depend on
the existing preference, the relative strength of subpopulations, the cost of
altering behaviour, the social group pressure and the extra benefit to indi-
viduals adopting the preferred behaviour in their respective subpopulation.
The social group pressure could be a “double-edged sword” in influencing the
altered behavioural changes and hence the resulting epidemic dynamics.
The vaccination behaviour is explored with two approaches. First, in
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the vaccination population game framework, the second model in this thesis
deals with the impact of three characteristics of imperfect vaccine in a two-
class vaccine-induced immunity epidemic model on individual-scale vaccina-
tion strategy choosing based on the population-scale vaccination rate. When
vaccine is not effective in reducing the susceptibility of the vaccinated indi-
viduals, the greater reduction of infectivity to vaccinated infected individuals
would be beneficial in circumventing the persistence of disease despite instant
vaccination is achieved in the population. If vaccine is able to provide longer
duration of high immunity to vaccinated individuals and/or faster recovery in
breakthrough infection, the cost thresholds for no vaccination would increase.
Due to the imperfect vaccine, there exist multiple Nash equilibria vaccination
rates which complicate the disease control efforts.
Second, by quantifying the probability of choosing vaccination strategy
with a Gompertz-type of asymmetric function, the third model in this the-
sis looks into the smoothed best response of prevalence-based cost-benefit
considerations for voluntary vaccination within a mean-field framework. The
asymmetric smoothed best response produces the same vaccination coverage
and epidemic dynamics as those given by the symmetrically smoothed best re-
sponse except when the cost of vaccination is perceived to be very high. This
suggests that the Gompertz function is suitable in modelling the behavioural
changes for individuals who are usually risk-averse in nature.
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The early twentieth century witnessed one major disease outbreak, namely
the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic that infected 500 million people across the
world and killed 50 to 100 million people, which amount to three to five per-
cent of the world’s population at that time [98]. Despite significant medical
advances in the twenty-first century, health-related events occur in excess of
normal expectancy and public news about infectious disease outbreaks be-
come more common nowadays. During the period from November 2002 to
July 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread from southern
China and Hong Kong to infect individuals in 37 countries [94] and caused an
eventual 8096 cases and 774 deaths, with 9.6% fatality rate [112]. Also, the
confirmed death cases in the 2009 flu pandemics reached 14,285 worldwide
[29].
Considering these historical and recent statistics as well as scientific ad-
vancement in health and medicine, it should not be denied that controlling and
responding to future pandemics will be more challenging due to a number of
emerging global trends including increased and denser urbanization, increased
local and global travel, as well as a generally older and immune-compromised
population [61]. The emergence of high-profile respiratory infectious diseases
such as SARS epidemic, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Zika
1
and variant influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, persistent prevalence of child-
hood communicable diseases such as measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) and per-
tussis, as well as non-vaccine-preventable sexually-transmitted diseases such
as human immune-deficiency virus infection / acquired immune-deficiency
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) have not only threaten millions of people throughout
the world, but also brought substantial economic and social impacts. There-
fore, it becomes an acute need for governments and public health systems to
evaluate the control measures designed to prevent infectious disease spreading.
Epidemiology is the science of study focusing on the cause-and-effect of
health and disease conditions in the population, targeted on improving con-
trol measures and policy-making decisions. Borrowing terminologies from the
theory of complexity, disease spreading is a complex (i.e. not fully know-
able, but reasonably predictable) dynamic problem, or sometimes, can even
be regarded as chaotic (i.e. neither knowable nor predicable) problem, such
as the cases of SARS which spread on the Asian continent in 2003. The
unpredictability in the occurrence of disease outbreaks is the consequence of
an uncountable number of interactions among numerous components rang-
ing from epidemiological characteristics (e.g. mode of transmission, contact
pattern, genetic susceptible or resistance, latent or infectious period, recovery
rate, type and amount of disease control etc.) to socio-demographic factors
(e.g. age, gender, as well as social, cultural and economic activities etc.), geo-
graphic factors (e.g. spatial location, travelling and visitation, neighbourhood
and community structure etc.) and also environmental factors (e.g. climate,
seasons, landscape, land use etc.).
Moreover, human behaviour plays a central role in the spread of infectious
diseases, and understanding the influence of individuals behavioural changes
and responses on the spread of diseases can be the key to improving disease
control efforts [39]. For instance, sexual behavioural changes (i.e. the use of
condom, sexual abstinence until marriage etc.) have been identified as the key
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to success in the control of HIV in Uganda [43]. However, for mild infections
such as a minor cold, people rarely fundamentally change their behaviour,
but with lethal or novel infectious diseases, they will change their behaviour
considerably to try to reduce their risk of infection. For instance, the dra-
matic reduction in travel and social contact were observed in Hong Kong and
Singapore during the 2003 SARS epidemic [32].
In the context of epidemiology, human behavioural change is referred to as
individuals change of their behaviour in a way that is relevant for the spread of
disease, that is how people act or response to a disease outbreak. For instance,
behaviours such as facemask wearing, increased hand-washing, and avoidance
of crowded places were observed during the Hong Kong SARS epidemic [54]
and H1N1 influenza pandemic [71]. Indeed, focusing on individual behaviours
as a key determinant of the dynamics of infectious diseases in mathemat-
ical epidemiology could be categorized into a specific discipline known as
behavioural epidemiology [1], and the mathematical models constructed are
called disease-behaviour models. Without incorporating behavioural changes
and/or responses, the disease spreading models will predict the “worst” pos-
sible scenario [22].
Behavioural changes in relation to the infectious disease spreading can be
categorized into two broad classes based on the motivation to start taking
a particular preventive action, namely changes imposed by public health au-
thorities and individual self-initiated behavioural changes [73]. The changes
imposed by public-health authorities refer to actions taken by people in the
population as a result of public control measures, including the closure of
schools and workplaces, bans on public gatherings such as social and sports
events, as well as travel restrictions to high-risk regions. These will change
the mobility or contact patterns of individuals in the population. As for the
self-initiated behavioural changes, individuals adopt their activities volun-
tarily due to the concerns induced by the disease, such as avoiding crowded
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places, social distancing (i.e. staying at home), wearing protective face masks,
practicing better hygiene, reducing travels (which could be categorized into
non-pharmaceutical interventions), or using preventive medicines and tak-
ing vaccination voluntarily (which indeed are the pharmaceutical interven-
tions). From the mathematical modelling perspective, the pharmaceutical
interventions change the disease state of the individuals. For instance, by
taking voluntary vaccination, individuals shift from susceptible class to vacci-
nated/recovered class. Meanwhile, it is assumed that certain epidemiological
parameters, such as the disease transmission rate in the epidemic models, may
be modified as the results of adopting non-pharmaceutical interventions.
In reality, individual’s responses often shift as an epidemic progresses.
Human behaviour in the context of epidemiology is based on attitudes, be-
lief systems, opinions and awareness of a disease, and all these factors can
change over time, both in individual and population levels [39]. Neverthe-
less, it is generally believed that risk perception (i.e. the awareness or belief
about the potential hazard) shapes individual behaviour [57], and moreover
the risk perception may in turn be shaped by the consequences of individual
behaviour [102]. For instance, individuals often refuse or avoid vaccinations
they perceived to be risky. On the other hand, a successful immunization
program (i.e. a high proportion of people opt for vaccination) will strongly
bring the disease prevalence down and therefore reduce the perceived infection
risk, resulting in a decline in vaccine demand [1]. In addition, the perceived
benefits (resp. costs) may be conceivably constructed as the beliefs about the
positive (resp. negative) outcomes associated with a behaviour in response
to a real or perceived disease prevalence. Therefore, it can thus be suggested
that the difference between the benefits and costs of adopting certain health
preventive actions will stimulate (resp. discourage) individuals in altering
their behaviours voluntarily.
In general, every rational individual has certain level of crisis awareness. If
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an (non risk-seeking) individual realizes that there are infected people around
him/her, he/she will spontaneously take some preventive actions to protect
himself/herself [83]. It is likely that awareness and knowledge are closely
related. Awareness of individuals often comes from two different sources of
information, namely the globally and locally available information [39, 73].
Newspapers, television stations, websites and other media channels that dis-
seminated information published by public health authorities are some typical
examples of the globally available information. For instance, health-related
newscasts would change individuals’ perceptions on vaccine safety and efficacy
[8]. Meanwhile, the locally available information includes the spread of infor-
mation by word of mouth among acquaintances in local community or social
neighbourhood. As nowadays information could be quickly spread in social
media, it is not surprising that even with just the word of mouth of aware
individuals advising their social acquaintances to take flu shot, the dynamics
of seasonal-like influenza epidemic may be shifted dramatically [42]. Thus,
social influence (i.e. the behavioural change of individuals affected by others
in a social network [96]) becomes a widely accepted phenomenon in studying
the change of individual- and population-scale health-protective behaviour in
the course of epidemic outbreaks.
In the context of health beliefs, according to [69], in order for behaviour
to change, people must feel personally vulnerable to a health threat, view the
possible consequences as severe, and see that taking action is likely to either
prevent or reduce the risk at an acceptable cost with few barriers. In other
words, the cost-benefit consideration is of utmost relevance in making decision
whether or not to alter the behaviour. Not only that, they also pointed out
that some internal or external stimulus is required to ensure that actual be-
haviour change occurs. In [111], some key internal (e.g. beliefs, perceptions,
etc.) and external (e.g. healthcare practitioners’ advice, vaccine availability,
cost etc.) stimuli which influence the individual behavioural changes during a
disease outbreak are listed. Since the self-initiated behavioural change is not
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mandatory, individuals will decide to adopt it, or not, by making some cost-
benefit considerations as well as under the influence of various factors such as
social factors and the information received. We focus on this individual-level
decision making, by taking the game-theoretical approaches, for both phar-
maceutical (specifically, voluntary vaccination) and non-pharmaceutical in-
terventions (specifically, pre-cautionary health protective actions) of the self-
induced behavioural changes in this thesis.
1.2 Game-theoretical approaches in the disease-
behaviour models
In the context of game theory, a game is an abstract formulation of an interac-
tive decision situation with possibly conflicting interests [97]. A game consists
of players (which are the decision-makers), strategies (or actions, behaviours),
payoffs (or fitness, in the field of biology) and strategy switching rules. Hence,
game theory could be considered as a mathematical approach for studying the
conflict and/or cooperation between decision-makers (e.g. human, animals,
companies, countries etc). The classical game theory assumes that the players
are fully rational and have complete information about the game (i.e. his/her
own and opponent (or interaction partner) strategy profiles (i.e. the set of all
possible strategies) as well as the payoffs received by them for each possible
combination of strategies), whereas the evolutionary game theory relaxes the
full rationality assumption in which players may have incomplete information
in the strategy interactions. A rational player will always choose the best
strategy that maximizes his/her payoff, in response to the strategy chosen by
others, which is a concept known as the best response correspondence.
In modelling the human behaviour on the disease spread, at microscopic
level, the players or the decision-makers are usually referred to as the sus-
ceptible individuals who decide whether or not to adopt some pharmaceuti-
cal and/or non-pharmaceutical interventions. Hence, the term “vaccination
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behaviour” in disease-behaviour models reflects that upon receiving infor-
mation on the diseases, individuals who are given the chance for updating
their strategies (i.e. play the game) will choose in between two strategies,
i.e. vaccination and non-vaccination, in a voluntary vaccination program. By
choosing the vaccination strategy, it is assumed that individuals go to vacci-
nate and the vaccine-induced immunity takes effect in protecting them from
infection risks immediately, which can be termed as the positive payoff (i.e.
the benefit) for the vaccination strategy. While, if the non-vaccination strat-
egy is chosen, the individual is subjected to the infection risk, which is indeed
the negative payoff (i.e. the cost). Therefore, individuals are said to make
use of cost-benefit analysis (considerations) in choosing what is best for them.
For two-person games in the classical game theory, the strategy profile
and its payoff may be given in the form of a static payoff matrix. The out-
come of the strategy interactions (or simply, the solution of the games) is,
either a pure or mixed strategy, Nash equilibrium if no player could increase
his/her payoff by unilaterally switching to other strategy. However, in a pop-
ulation consisting of infinitely many players (and hence infinitely repeated
games played), the strategy choice for a focal player depends on the payoff
difference between his/her own payoff and the strategy interaction partner’s
payoff, in which the strategy update rule is indeed the pairwise payoff com-
parison, where one of the players may switch to the strategy of the other.
This microscopic level of strategy switching (or mutation, in biology) could
be either explicitly implemented as a rule-based model in agent-based simu-
lation frameworks or implicitly modelled in population (or mean-field) games.
In population games, all players (or agents) have identical payoff matrix
and it is assumed that players are randomly matched for strategy interactions
(i.e. play the game) with some probability at each time step, which indeed
governs the speed of game dynamics. Therefore, for any player, he/she would
be regarded as playing the game against a single representative individual
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who plays the population’s average strategy as a mixed strategy [97]. Hence,
it is the evolution of strategy frequencies at macroscopic level that is of most
concern in the population games. Also, the expected payoff of players playing
a certain strategy is now expressed as a function of the strategy frequencies,
rather than a static scalar value in classical game theory. Therefore, this
framework leads to the evolutionary game theory which focuses on the dy-
namics of strategy adaptation. Examples of population games in game theory
literature include the replicator dynamics [100], the best response dynamics
and the logit dynamics (also known as the smoothed best response [36]).
In replicator dynamics, the per capita growth rate of a given strategy is
proportional to the payoff difference between the strategy and the average
payoff of the population. Hence, the evolution of strategy frequencies could
be described in the form of the replicator dynamical equation, which is a
first-order ordinary differential equation. Also, the stationary states of the
replicator equation give the evolutionary stable strategies (corresponding to
the Nash equilibria in classical game theory). In biology, strategies are mostly
inherited. However, the underlying mechanism of strategy switching in epi-
demiology involves social learning and hence the replicator dynamics is also
known as imitation dynamics in disease-behaviour models. Hence, the termi-
nologies “game dynamics”, “replicator dynamics” and “imitation dynamics”
are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
As individuals are heterogeneous or may belong to certain groups with
specific preferences, they may perceive the risk of infection in different way
and make decisions under the influence of intra- or inter-group pressure. In-
dividuals also tend to imitate other behaviour (or strategy) in their mutual
interactions. As a result, individual behavioural changes in epidemic out-
break could be studied through coupling the replicator dynamical equation
and an epidemic compartmental model, which was pioneered by Bauch [2]
who investigated the vaccination behaviour in childhood diseases. Bauch’s
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framework was modified to investigate the susceptible spontaneous behaviour
change (specifically whether or not to alter their behaviour in order to reduce
their infection risks) in [74]. In this thesis, we extend the one-population
model of [74] to a two-subpopulation model by using the multi-population
game dynamical modelling framework proposed in [47, 48] so as to take into
account the heterogeneity between groups in decision making.
Behaviour change spreads due to not only the information of disease in-
cidence, but also the observations of individuals about their own behaviour
status as compared to the population-level of average behaviour status. This
leads to the development of modelling the implications of the population-scale
epidemic dynamics on individual-scale decision choices by making use of the
Markov decision process theory [77, 79] in disease-behaviour models. As vac-
cine efficacy plays an important role in shaping individual perceived benefits
and costs of vaccination, we extend the one-class imperfect immunity model
in [79] within their vaccination population games framework by incorporating
three additional characteristics of imperfect vaccine, as those proposed in [30]
to the two-class vaccine-induced immunity “vaccination population games”.
In game theory, the best response refers to the strategy that gives the most
favourable outcome to an individual, which may be expressed mathemati-
cally in a step-wise function. As far as the voluntary vaccination behaviour
is concerned, the epidemic models incorporating the best response dynam-
ics of cost-benefit analysis in strategy switching are mostly implemented in
mean-field models. However, the continuous version of the smoothed best
response which is expressed in Fermi’s strategy updating rule (it is indeed a
symmetrical sigmoid function), is mostly implemented in agent-based simula-
tion models. We follow the framework of [116] in which a logistic function is
used to model the continuous (or adult) voluntary vaccination decision mak-
ing based on a simple cost-benefit analysis, but extend the smoothed best
response from symmetric property to asymmetric one by using another type
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of sigmoid functions known as Gompertz functions.
1.3 Objectives
The primary aim of this work is to study the individual-level decision making
on adopting the self-initiated pre-cautionary health preventive actions or tak-
ing the voluntary vaccination in the course of epidemic outbreak with three
game-theoretical modelling frameworks. Specifically, this project has the fol-
lowing objectives:
(i) Formulate a two-subpopulation game-dynamical model to study the in-
terplays between the individual self-initiated pre-cautionary health pro-
tective behaviour, imitation and epidemic dynamics under the influence
of cost-benefit consideration and social group pressure.
(ii) Investigate the impact of imperfect vaccines and two-class vaccine-induced
immunity on vaccine coverage and epidemic dynamics based on the vac-
cination population games framework.
(iii) Develop an epidemic model with individual vaccination strategy adoption
governed by asymmetric smoothed best response function.
Our goal in this thesis is not to study a disease in particular, but to
carry out a deeper investigation with regard to the impact of incorporating
human behaviours in epidemic modelling. Rather than constructing compli-
cated model structures to investigate various aspects of human behaviours
and responses in the spread of infectious diseases, we build three simple
mean-field disease-behaviour models with minimal equations and simplest epi-
demic dynamics to capture the fundamental concepts in two aspects of human
behaviour, namely vaccination behaviour and self-initiated pre-cautionary
health protective behaviour. Besides that, the parameter values used in the
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numerical simulations are not intended to be highly realistic, but rather to il-
lustrate particular scenarios or principles and explain the dynamical behaviour
which the models can exhibit by incorporating certain aspect of game theory
in the modelling. Also, no model validations with real data were carried out.
The focuses of this work are given to the mathematical formulations and nu-
merical simulations, rather than the theoretical analysis and the methods of
solution to the models.
1.4 Main contributions of this thesis
The contributions of this thesis include the following aspects.
(i) Construction of a new two-subpopulation imitation dynamical model
whereby susceptibles in different subpopulations have different prefer-
ences in adopting health protective behaviour.
(ii) Construction of vaccination population games with three additional char-
acteristics of imperfect vaccine in a two-class vaccine-induced immunity
epidemic model.
(iii) Development of a new asymmetric smoothed best response function for
determining the individual voluntary vaccination strategy adoption in an
epidemic model with vaccination.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One gives the background and
the objectives of the research as well as the structure of the thesis. Chapter
Two presents the literature review in a wider scope on two types of human
behavioural changes on the disease spread. The basics in epidemic models
11
with partially vaccine-induced immunity, without game theory elements, are
also given to serve as the fundamental concepts for further investigations on
corresponding models but with game-theoretical elements. It is followed by
three separate models in the subsequent three chapters with their own spe-
cific backgrounds and literatures. Chapter Three concerns the self-initiated
pre-cautionary health protective behavioural changes whereas Chapter Four
and Five deal with vaccination behaviours.
In Chapter Three, the one-population natural selection and imitation dy-
namics model for behavioural changes involving self-initiated pre-cautionary
health protective actions in an emerging disease is extended to two sub-
populations model with different preferences. The derivations of the two-
subpopulation replicator dynamical equations for the natural selection as well
as imitation process involving the cost-benefit analysis and social group pres-
sure are given. We explore the impact of the subpopulation with existing pref-
erence and relative strength, the cost of altering behaviour, the social group
pressure and the extra benefit to individuals adopting the subpopulation’s
preferred strategy on the strategy distributions. We show that the numerical
simulation results are in good agreement with the local stability analysis.
Chapter Four investigates the impact of imperfect vaccine on the individual-
scale voluntary vaccination decision-making based on the population-scale
epidemiological status within the framework of vaccination population games.
The analysis of the associated reproduction number for the epidemic model
with two classes of infected and/or vaccinated individuals is given and the
existence of the phenomenon of backward bifurcation is shown by using the
center manifold theorem. Then, we give the procedure involved in finding the
utility function and the cost threshold for vaccination population game anal-
ysis in a step-by-step approach. The simulation results highlight the possible
vaccination coverage for three additional characteristics of imperfect vaccines
and the existence of multiple Nash equilibria vaccination rates.
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The first part of Chapter Five is devoted to the literature review on
two types of function (or correspondence, namely the best response and the
smoothed best response) used in describing the probability of choosing the
vaccination strategy in both the mean-field well-mixed and the agent-based
network epidemic models. As we propose to use the smoothed best response
function in the epidemic mean-field model with partially vaccine-induced im-
munity, we present the mathematical formulations of the Gompertz function
in governing the individuals smoothed best response on the cost and benefit
considerations of getting vaccination. The dynamical behaviour of the re-
sulting system is studied through a combination of the Jacobian matrix, the
graphical approach and again the center manifold theorem. We then explore
the difference between the (asymmetric) Gompertz function and the (sym-
metric) logistic function on the vaccine uptake level in this chapter.
A brief summary of the research is given in the first part of Chapter Six.
Several possible future studies on the current topic are then given in the sec-




In this chapter, we present the literature reviews for game-theoretical mathe-
matical modelling of vaccination behaviour and pre-cautionary health protec-
tive behaviour. Besides that, we give the fundamental concepts dealing with
epidemic models with partially vaccine-induced immunity.
2.1 Mathematical modelling of voluntary vac-
cination behaviour using game-theoretical
approach
Game-theoretical approach, specifically the replicator dynamical equation,
was initially used in [2] to investigate the interplays between individual vol-
untary vaccination behaviour, vaccine coverage and vaccine-preventable child-
hood disease dynamics in a well-mixed population. In this context, the players
of the game are parents who decide between two strategies, that is whether
to vaccinate their children or not based on the payoff maximization (or equiv-
alently, loss-minimization) behaviour. This strategy decision-making can be
largely determined through the cost-benefit analysis on the expected payoffs
of the strategies. Vaccination incurs certain fixed costs (e.g. time and money
spent, the vaccine adverse effects, etc.) but is sufficient to confer lifelong im-
munity (assuming the vaccine is perfect), while non-vaccinators are exposed
to the prevalence-dependent risk of infection and the subsequent monetary
loss (e.g. absence from school / workplace, treatment expenses etc.). There
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is a temptation to free-ride on the herd immunity of others by opting not to
vaccinate but may still be free from infection. The individuals’ fully ratio-
nality and self-interest behaviour lead to oscillations in vaccine coverage over
time [2, 78] and hence voluntary vaccination is unlikely to achieve society-
optimal level [5] for a complete disease eradication [3]. However, the presence
of altruistic individuals who are willing to increase payoff of others regardless
beneficial to oneself or not can significantly shift the vaccine coverage towards
the society optimum [91].
Unlike vaccine-preventable childhood diseases, the vaccine for recurrent
infectious diseases such as influenza are usually effective only for one sea-
son owing to mutation of pathogens and waning immunity [104]. Hence,
the evolutionary game theory is employed to capture the strategy interac-
tions between vaccinators and non-vaccinators during a voluntary vaccina-
tion program, before the next seasonal epidemic begins (see e.g., [35, 104]).
An individual’s payoff is assigned according to their vaccination status and
disease status during the last epidemic season. Individuals adjust their vacci-
nation strategy through observations on their randomly selected role model’s
(or neighbour’s) payoff outcomes and imitate the more successful one with the
probability governed by Fermi strategy updating rule (see e.g. [35, 11, 13]).
This pairwise payoff comparison takes into account the bounded rationality
of human behaviour in which there is a possibility that the worst performing
strategy is being imitated. Since individuals make repeated vaccination de-
cisions based on their expectations about future events, this individual-level
adaptive decisions collectively determine the vaccine coverage and therefore
influence the disease dynamics, and conversely, the disease dynamics influ-
ence the likelihood that individuals will choose to vaccinate. Due to their
inherent complexity, this scenario is usually modelled through a bottom-up
approach, specifically, within an agent-based modelling simulation framework.
Individuals interpret the information that they obtain through observa-
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tions in the social contact and conjecture about the vaccination strategies of
others. Hence, social contact structure has a significant impact on voluntary
vaccination behaviour and its corresponding disease dynamics. Unlike well-
mixed population in which diseases are not eradicated due to the free-riding
effect, social contact structures enable disease eradication when vaccine risk is
not too high and disease risk is not too low [72], particularly effective in scale-
free network than regular networks (since hub nodes of scale-free networks are
more inclined to take vaccination) [119], as well as in adaptive networks than
static networks [90]. The clustering of non-vaccinator individuals in struc-
tural population, either caused by imitation [62] or opinion formation process
[12, 86], has a strong unfavourable effect on disease eradication especially
when vaccination coverage is approximately achieving herd immunity. How-
ever, with the presence of committed vaccinators to stimulate other imitators
to take vaccination, the effect of clustering of susceptible non-vaccinator can
be significantly reduced [58]. Besides that, individuals’ high conformity to
social influence will strengthen the negative correlation between cost of vac-
cination and vaccine coverage [114].
From a cost-benefit analysis perspective, individual vaccination decision-
making is strongly governed by their perceptions on the severity of the dis-
ease outbreak and the perceived risk of vaccination. These risk perceptions
are closely related to individuals’ prior knowledge and awareness. As stated
in the review paper [39], all epidemic models incorporating human behaviour
make assumptions on the source and type of information that individuals’
decision is based on. The interplay between voluntary vaccination behaviour,
publicly available information and childhood disease dynamics was initially
modelled analytically without incorporating the concept of imitation game
dynamics. Even so, similar to models with imitation dynamics, information
dependent vaccination also demonstrates clearly the oscillatory behaviour of
vaccine coverage when parents use not only the current but also the past
information [26], the delayed information [9] about the disease and informa-
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tion on the disease’s mortality [27] to make their vaccination decisions. As
compared to how people arrive at their choices based on locally available
“private” information, public information communicated by public health au-
thorities [25] and newscasts providing individuals with more epidemiological
information [8] are able to stabilize the imitation-induced oscillations, to al-
low disease elimination. Moreover, the possibility for the individuals to go
for vaccination increases with the amount of information and the degree of
sensitivity towards the information obtained by individuals [83] as well as the
reporting rate of severe disease infections, but decreases with the reporting
rate of vaccine-related adverse effect [114]. Individuals’ own characteristics
(such as their experience and memory) also have an impact on the adoption
of vaccination. The vaccination and disease dynamics become less variable
when individuals integrate more of their prior epidemic seasons experience in
their decision-making [18, 110].
2.2 Mathematical modelling of self-initiated
pre-cautionary health protective behaviour
using game-theoretical approach
One of the underlying assumptions in modelling the self-initiated pre-cautionary
health protective behaviour in the spread of infectious diseases is that upon
receiving any information on diseases, individuals may activate their be-
havioural responses by voluntarily taking some non-pharmaceutical interven-
tion measures to reduce their infection risks. For instance, by social distanc-
ing practices (either staying at home from workplaces or schools, or avoiding
crowded places and social events etc.), the contact rates between susceptible
and infected individuals can be significantly reduced and hence the disease
transmission rate, say β, may be modified. This implies that individuals are
not risk-seeking. Also, the pre-cautionary health protective behaviour is as-
sumed to be effective in reducing the disease transmission but not able to
totally eliminate the infectious diseases. Therefore, a modification parameter
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(or a susceptibility reduction factor), say α ∈ (0, 1), is being multiplied with
β in well-mixed epidemic models [73, 74, 75] or agent-based network epidemic
models [17, 33] incorporating pre-cautionary health protective behavioural
changes.
Similar to the vaccination behaviour, individuals may make use of simple
cost-benefit considerations or imitate other’s behaviour in choosing whether
or not to alter their behaviour to reduce their infection risks. In literatures
involving well-mixed epidemic models with game-theoretical approaches, the
population average reduction of force of infection due to pre-cautionary health
preventive actions could be expressed in two ways. First, by using the repli-
cator dynamical equation [74, 75], the authors assumed that susceptibles who
alter their behaviours may have to pay some fixed extra inconvenient costs
(e.g. absence from schools or works, cancelling travels) than doing nothing
(termed as “normal” behaviour in [74]). Hence, the population average re-
duction of force of infection is determined by the proportion of susceptible
adopting altered behaviour at any time in the course of epidemic outbreak.
Second, in social distancing games [76, 77], in which the Markov decision
process theory was employed, the population average reduction of force of
infection is expressed as a monotone decreasing function of the intensity of
investments of susceptibles social distancing practice. This means that the
larger the investments (which could be analogous to the cost of altered be-
haviour in [74]), the lower the population average force of infection will be.
2.3 Epidemic models with continuous vacci-
nation and partially vaccine-induced im-
munity
Although there is a rapidly growing literature on investigating voluntary vac-
cination behaviour using the game-theoretical approach, most of the frame-
works assume that vaccine confers lifelong immunity. There has been rela-
tively little research on accessing the impact of vaccine efficacy on vaccination
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behaviour. As Chapter Four and Five in this thesis are devoted to address
the issue of imperfect vaccine on vaccination behaviour, we briefly discuss the
basics of the imperfect vaccine to the epidemic dynamics, without the com-
ponents of game theory in this section.
The Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Vaccinated (SIRV) epidemic com-




= Λ− β I
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V − γI − µI, (2.1b)
dR
dt
= γI − µR, (2.1c)
dV
dt
= π̄S − σβ I
N
V − µV, (2.1d)
where the total population size is N = S + I + R + V . Λ is the (constant)
recruitment rate of susceptible corresponding to births and immigrations, µ
is the constant natural death rate of the population, β is the disease trans-
mission rate, γ is the recovery rate, σ ∈ [0, 1) is the probability of vaccine
failure while 1− σ gives the vaccine efficacy and π̄ is the population average
vaccination rate, which could be constant or time-varying depending on the
modelling assumptions.
We further define σ as the probability of vaccine failure in degree [50, 59,
63] simply to reflect the scenario of partial immunity (i.e. the vaccine-induced
immunity may not be fully protective [41]). This is particularly relevant as
the strain of infectious diseases such as influenza often mutates rapidly enough
[7] that being vaccinated does not guarantee individuals are fully protected
from the risk of infection. Thus, the expression 1 − σ predefines the degree
of the reduction of susceptibility for the vaccinated individuals. σ = 0 means
that the vaccine is fully effective in reducing the susceptibility and system
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(2.1) could be reduced to the SIR model whereby both the vaccine-acquired
and infection-acquired immunity would remove the individuals from the sus-
ceptible pool. On the other hand, σ = 1 implies that the vaccine is totally
useless and from the perspective of controlling the infectious diseases, it is
not worth to introduce such a vaccine to the host population. Hence, we will
not consider the case of σ = 1 in this thesis. In other words, we assume that
the vaccine is at least offering some degree of protection to the vaccinated
individuals.
For the epidemic compartmental model in system (2.1), which does not in-
volve a vector (i.e. a carrier of disease-causing agent) and different host types,
the concept of the basic reproduction number (R0) is sufficient to quantify
the driving force of the spread of infection [82]. The R0 is defined as the aver-
age (or expected) number of individuals (secondary infection) infected by one
typical infective (primary infection), over his/her entire duration of infection,
in a whole susceptible population. For an epidemic compartmental model
with n disease compartments (i.e. the individuals in the compartments are
infected), the basic reproduction number can be computed using the method
of the next generation matrix [23] by the steps given below.
Step 1: Find Fi(x0) and Vi(x0), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Fi ≥ 0 represents new
infections in compartment i, Vi ≤ 0 represents a net outflow from
compartment i (such as the recovery rate, death rate etc.), and x0 is
the disease free equilibrium (DFE).
Step 2: Find the n × n next generation matrix K = FV−1 at DFE, where F
and V are the m×m matrices defined by F = ∂Fi(x0)
∂xj
and V = ∂Vi(x0)
∂xj
,
with 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Step 3: Find the spectral radius (the dominant eigenvalue) of the matrix K,
which gives the basic reproduction number R0.
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At t→∞, we have N → Λ
µ
. For the case where the vaccine offers complete
protection (σ = 0), by assuming Λ = µ (and without loss of generality, we
have N = 1), system (2.1) has DFE, E0 = (S0, I0, R0, V0) = (
µ
π̄+µ
, 0, 0, π̄
π̄+µ
).




The notation RC reflects the reproduction number with vaccination as a con-
trol measure and is usually known as the control reproduction number. It is
defined as the average number of secondary infections produced by a primary
infected person in a population consisting of susceptible and vaccinated indi-
viduals. If π̄ = 0, then theRC is reduced toR0 = βγ+µ . When π̄ > 0, ifRC > 1
(and hence R0 > 1), then the disease grows. If RC < 1 (resp. R0 < 1), then
the disease dies out with the presence (resp. absence) of vaccination program.
It can be seen that RC < 1 if and only if π̄ > π̄critical = µ(R0 − 1), where
π̄critical is the critical vaccination coverage level.
Similarly, for vaccine with partial immunity (0 < σ < 1), we have the same
DFE E0 but the effective reproduction number is given by Reff = βγ+µ
σπ̄+µ
π̄+µ
with the critical vaccination coverage level becomes π̄c =
µ(R0−1)
1−σR0 . The most
important consequence of relaxing the assumption of fully-protective vaccine
is that although π̄ > π̄c leads to Reff < 1, it no longer guarantees disease
eradication.
2.3.1 The existence of multiple endemic equilibria
When 0 < σ < 1, the endemic equilibrium point(s) of system (2.1) is given
by E∗ = (S∗, I∗, R∗, V ∗) where R∗ = γ
µ
I∗, S∗ = (γ+µ)N
∗
β
− σV ∗ and V ∗ =
π̄(γ+µ)N∗
β[σπ̄+σλ∗+µ]
with λ∗ = β I
∗
N∗
. Since S∗ + I∗ +R∗ + V ∗ = N∗, we obtain
I∗ = N∗
(
1− γ + µ
β
− (1− σ) π̄(γ + µ)





By substituting expression (2.2) into λ∗ = β I
∗
N∗
, after some algebraic manip-
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ulations, we obtain
Q(λ∗) = A(λ∗)2 +Bλ∗ + C,
where
A = σ(γ + µ) > 0,
B = (γ + µ) [σπ̄ + µ+ σµ(1−R0)] ,
C = µ(γ + µ)(π̄ + µ) [1−Reff] .
(2.3)




as the solution(s) of quadratic equation (2.3) in which λ∗ could be obtained




. Hence, it is obvious that there is
a possibility of the existence of multiple endemic equilibria when the vaccine
only offers partial immunity (0 < σ < 1), as compared to the assumption that
the vaccine offers full protection to vaccinated individuals (σ = 0).
As the type and number of solutions to the quadratic equation will be




4σµ(γ + µ)2(π̄ + µ)
≡ Rceff (2.4)
where the sub-threshold Rceff < 1. Also, it is easy to see that B > 0 implies
that R0 < 1 + σπ̄+µσµ ≡ R
c
0. The solutions to quadratic equation (2.3) and the
corresponding property of the SIRV model could be deduced as the following
cases.
(i) If Reff > 1 (⇔ C < 0), then B2 − 4AC > 0 regardless the sign of B.
The quadratic Q(λ∗) has two real roots with opposite sign. Since only
the positive root is biological feasible, the partial immunity model has a
unique positive endemic equilibrium.
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(ii) If Reff = 1 (⇔ C = 0), then Q(λ∗) = λ∗(Aλ∗ + B) = 0. We have λ∗ = 0
(i.e. DFE, I∗ = 0) or λ∗ = −B
A
. The model has a unique endemic equi-
librium if B < 0 (i.e. R0 > Rc0).
(iii) For the case of Reff < 1 (⇔ C > 0), we analyse the following subcases:
(a) If B ≥ 0 (i.e. R0 ≤ Rc0) or B2−4AC < 0, then Q(λ∗) has no positive
(or real) roots. (b) If B < 0 (i.e. R0 > Rc0), then the Q(λ∗) has two
positive real roots if B2−4AC > 0 (i.e. Reff > Rceff). Besides that, Q(λ∗)
has a positive real root of multiplicity 2 if B2 − 4AC = 0. This positive
real root of multiplicity of 2 is simply given by λ∗ = − B
2A
> 0.
Therefore, we conclude that there exist multiple endemic equilibria for
system (2.1), with 0 < σ < 1 whenever Rceff < Reff < 1. This existence of
multiple endemic states is the main characteristics of a phenomenon known as
backward bifurcation, which has been observed in numerous epidemic models
with vaccine that only offers partial immunity.
2.3.2 Backward bifurcation
In dynamical systems, bifurcation phenomenon is pertinent to the occurrence
of the qualitative change in the structural behaviours (e.g. the equilibria and
its stability) of the system when a parameter value of the system is varied.
Generally, mathematical models with multiple steady states give rise to bifur-
cation phenomena. In epidemic control, the basic reproduction number R0
and/or other associated reproduction numbers, for instance, RC and Reff, are
indeed the disease threshold condition, i.e. the condition necessary for disease
invasion (the existence of endemic state) in the population. As R0 increases
and approaches unity, the DFE (which is characterized by the absence of in-
fectious individuals) changes its stability from stable to unstable, in which
this phenomenon involves a transcritical bifurcation.
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(a) Forward bifurcation (b) Backward bifurcation
Figure 2.1: The schematic diagram of forward and backward bifurcation.
In this context, there are two types of transcritical bifurcation, namely for-
ward (supercritical) bifurcation and backward (subcritical) bifurcation, which
give the “direction” of the endemic state (i.e. I∗) close to the disease thresh-
old, R0 = 1 (Figure 2.1, the solid lines denote stability and the dashed lines
denote instability). If the endemic state exists only for R0 > 1 but not for
R0 < 1, a forward bifurcation occurs (Figure 2.1(a)) and the endemic level
increases slightly and continuously as R0 increases through unity. However,
if the backward bifurcation occurs, as R0 increases and once it goes across
unity, I∗ suddenly jumps from DFE to a high endemic level. Even though
the R0 is reduced back below one, there exist two endemic states, a low level
of unstable endemicity and a higher level of stable endemicity (see Figure
2.1(b)). Depending on the initial number of infected individuals, the system
may end up with the lower endemic level or the higher one. Further reducing
the epidemic threshold R0 to a subthreshold Rc0 , the saddle-node bifurcation
occurs in which the two endemic states collide and annihilate each other. In
short, backward bifurcation is a phenomenon typically characterized by the
co-existence of multiple stable equilibria when the associated reproduction
number of the epidemic model is less than one [68].
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As far as the immunity in the host is concerned, the phenomenon of back-
ward bifurcation has often been observed in epidemic models with imperfect
vaccine [30, 52, 65], exogeneous reinfection [49, 89], resistance mechanism
[80] and structured acquired immunity [81]. From the epidemiological point
of view, the phenomenon of backward bifurcation has a negative impact on
disease control because reducing R0 (or its associated reproduction number)
below the unity does not guarantee disease eradication. The disease control
becomes highly dependent on the initial proportion of infectious individuals in
the population. The reproduction number must be further reduced to below
the subthreshold Rc0 for disease elimination.
2.3.3 The center manifold theorem
The qualitative analysis on the quadratic equation presented in Subsection
2.3.1 for showing the existence of multiple endemic equilibria and consequently
the backward bifurcation could be carried out in a more systematic way by
using the center manifold theorem, proven in [14], as given below.
Theorem 2.1. Consider the following system of ordinary differential equa-
tions with a parameter φ:
dx
dt
= f(x, φ), f :Rn × R→ R and f ∈ C2(Rn × R), (2.5)
where 0 is an equilibrium of the system that f(0, φ) = 0 for all φ and assume
(A1) J = Dx f(0, 0) =
∂fi(0,0)
∂xj
is the linearization of system (2.5) around the
equilibrium 0 with φ evaluated at 0. Zero is a simple eigenvalue of J
and all other eigenvalues of J have negative real parts.
(A2) Matrix J has a right eigenvector w and a left eigenvector v correspond-
ing to the zero eigenvalue.
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The local dynamics of system (2.5) around 0 are totally determined by the
signs of a and b.
(i) a > 0, b > 0. When φ < 0 with |φ|  1, the equilibrium point x = 0 is
locally asymptotically stable, and there exists a positive unstable equi-
librium; when 0 < φ  1, 0 is unstable and there exists a negative and
locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
(ii) a < 0, b < 0. When φ < 0 with |φ|  1, the equilibrium point x = 0 is
unstable; when 0 < φ 1, 0 is locally asymptotically stable equilibrium
and there exists a positive unstable equilibrium.
(iii) a > 0, b < 0. When φ < 0 with |φ|  1, the equilibrium point x = 0 is
unstable, and there exists a locally asymptotically stable negative equi-
librium; when 0 < φ 1, 0 is stable and there exists a positive unstable
equilibrium.
(iv) a < 0, b > 0. When φ changes from negative to positive, the equilib-
rium point x = 0 changes its stability from stable to unstable. Corre-




The literature review on modelling of vaccination behaviour and pre-cautionary
health protective behaviour in epidemic models with game-theoretical ap-
proaches has been briefly covered in the first part of this chapter. Then,
the basics of the epidemic models with partially vaccine-induced immunity,
namely the existence of the multiple endemic equilibria, the phenomenon of
backward bifurcation and the center manifold theorem used to examine the
types of transcritical bifurcation are presented in the second part of this chap-
ter, which serves as the fundamental concepts for more complicated systems








The role of human behaviour in the spread and control of infectious diseases
has received significant attention [39] and has been recognized as a specific
discipline in epidemiology, known as behavioural epidemiology [1]. Various
behavioural changes, including vaccination, the self-initiated pre-cautionary
health protective actions such as social distancing, wearing mask, reduc-
ing risky sexual behaviour, reducing travels, practicing better hygiene and
avoidence of congregated places, have been incorporated into mathematical
and computational epidemic models. Without including behavioural changes,
the disease spreading model will predict the “worst” possible scenario [22].
The disease-behaviour models capture the interplay between infectious dis-
ease dynamics and individual behaviours under the influence of various fac-
tors such as economic [51], social [4] and information [21]. In the course of
epidemic outbreak, individuals are not passive; they weigh up the costs asso-
ciated with certain self-initiated pre-cautionary health protective actions with
the benefit of reducing the infection risk, and then choose the best option or
strategy that maximizes their own benefit. The individual-level preferences
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and strategic decision-making process can be concisely described in the lan-
guage of game theory.
Unlike the game theory in the field of biology in which strategies are in-
herited, the underlying mechanism for the evolution of strategy adoption in
epidemiology is the imitation process. Individual strategic decision-making
can be conveniently fixed into a simple one-population susceptible-infective-
recovered (SIR) compartmental model in a well-mixed population setting
through the game-dynamical equation. For instance, a replicator equation is
used to model imitation dynamics and is coupled into a SIR epidemic model
in [2] to investigate the interplay between individual voluntary vaccination
behaviour, vaccine coverage and vaccine-preventable childhood disease dy-
namics, in which parents make the cost-benefit analysis to decide whether
or not to vaccinate their children. This model has been extended in [70] by
introducing social norm into it. Along similar lines, Poletti and co-authors
[74] modelled the spontaneous behavioural changes driven by cost-benefit con-
siderations on the perceived risk of infection whereby their game-dynamical
equation involves both the natural selection process and the imitation pro-
cess. Even with these simple well-mixed one-population models that couple
epidemic and imitation dynamics, rich epidemic dynamics, including oscilla-
tions and simulation results fitted with real disease incidence data, can be
achieved.
In one-population mean-field models, every individual has the same kind
of disease-causing contacts and strategy interactions in the homogeneous pop-
ulation. However, individuals are heterogeneous. The minimal level of details
required to model the differences in individual behaviour has been identified as
one of the nine challenges in incorporating the dynamics of human behaviour
in infectious disease models [38]. This challenge is essentially the heterogene-
ity between groups. That is, people that belong to certain group may be more
inclined to certain behaviour or perceive the risk of disease prevalence in a
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specific way. These give rise to the development of multi-group epidemic and
game-dynamical models.
Compared to one-population models, very few multi-group setting of com-
partmental models have been used in epidemic modelling incorporating hu-
man behaviour. Furthermore, among them, most of the studies are related
to vaccination behaviour, with specific investigations on different age groups
[6, 93], different countries [67], and different risk perceptions, for instance
pro-vaccinator (i.e. vaccine believer) versus anti-vaccinator (i.e. vaccine skep-
tics) [60, 92]. On the other domain of human behaviour in epidemiology,
the multi-population model was used in [75, 76] to study self-initiated pre-
cautionary health protective behaviour during epidemic. However, all these
studies assume that individuals only make cost-benefit considerations without
considering other social factors in their decision making. Hence, we focus on
the self-initiated pre-cautionary health protective actions adopted by suscep-
tibles in an emerging epidemic in two-subpopulation setting. The imitation
dynamics in our proposed model is constructed by taking account of a com-
bination of cost-benefit and social points of view.
Our proposed model differs from the epidemiology game between two sub-
populations constructed by Reluga [76] in the aspects of epidemic dynamics
and individual-level decision making. Reluga’s epidemic model is in metapop-
ulation setting whereas our proposed epidemic model is still in one single well-
mixed population. We make use of the metapopulation concepts in our game
dynamical model. This allows us to focus on the heterogeneity of individuals
in their decision making whereby susceptibles have competitive strategy in-
teractions in different subpopulations or groups, apart from keeping the full
model simpler. In other words, we assume that the physical contacts that
cause disease spread is homogeneous, but the behavioural contagion among
susceptibles are heterogeneous. By doing so, we are able to study the be-
havioural response in different groups with different preferences, and conse-
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quently how it affects the epidemic dynamics.
The early theoretical extension of game dynamics from one population
to two populations can be found in the seminal papers [99, 88]. In two-
subpopulation games, in principle, a player could be randomly paired with
one other player either from the same or different subpopulation. This leads
to two types of strategy interactions, namely intra- (i.e. within) and inter-
(i.e. between) subpopulation interactions. If one particular subpopulation
consists of only one kind of players, bi-matrix games are suitable for the situ-
ation whereby there are only inter-subpopulation but no intra-subpopulation
interactions [19, 97]. This specification rules out own subpopulation effects
[34]. However, since we are living in a modern society with people from dif-
ferent backgrounds, religious beliefs, cultures, and professions, both intra-
and inter-subpopulation strategy interactions are important in shaping our
decision making. Therefore, we choose the multi-population game-dynamical
modelling framework proposed in [47, 48] in constructing our game-dynamical
model. The framework allows strategies within and between groups (subpop-
ulations) with different preferences or beliefs. This is essential in investigating
the heterogeneity between groups of individuals in their decision making.
Our proposed model consists of two different dynamics, namely SIR epi-
demic dynamics and imitation dynamics. To distinguish the homogeneity of
our epidemic system and the heterogeneity of our game dynamical system, in
this chapter, we use the term ‘population’ when describing epidemic dynam-
ics and ‘subpopulation’ when describing imitation dynamics, i.e. epidemic
spread in one ‘population’ with individuals divided into two ‘subpopulations’
with different preferences in their strategy switching.
In Section 3.2, we construct a two-subpopulation game dynamical model
for natural selection and imitation process by taking accounts of the cost-
benefit analysis and group pressure. We then carry out the local stability
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analysis for the model at disease free equilibrium (DFE) in Section 3.3. Re-
sults and discussion are given in Section 3.4 followed by some concluding
remarks in Section 3.5.
3.2 Mathematical formulations
In the course of epidemic outbreak, upon receiving information on disease
prevalence, rational individuals would react by deciding whether or not to al-
ter their behaviour and adopt some pre-cautionary health protective actions
to lower their risk of infection. By adopting altered behaviour, an individual’s
risk of infection is reduced by a factor of α ∈ (0, 1) but he/she has to pay
some inconvenient cost. Thus, to study this kind of individual decision mak-
ing using game theory, we assume that individuals have two strategies, namely
normal behaviour (or strategy) and altered behaviour whereby the strategy
switching is performed by imitating one of the other individuals in the pop-
ulation with the aim to maximize their own payoff. Hence, in this section,
we formulate this imitation dynamics by using the so-called “normal against
altered behaviour game”, leading to a replicator dynamical equation coupled
with the SIR epidemic dynamics.
3.2.1 SIR epidemic and a two-subpopulation natural
selection model
Following the procedures and definitions in [74], we first extend the system
of one-population “natural” selection model into two-subpopulation model.
The natural selection is referred to as a form of strategy switching with-
out cost-benefit considerations. We assume that only susceptible involves in
“normal against altered behaviour game”. Also, each subpopulation has dif-
ferent preferences. We assume that subpopulation 1 prefers normal behaviour
and subpopulation 2 prefers altered behaviour. It is worth mentioning that
although each subpopulation is designated with their respective preference,
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individuals belong to each subpopulation are still given the freedom to adopt
either strategies based on the cost-benefit analysis in imitation process. The
preference of each subpopulation will later be modelled by adding an extra
profit to susceptibles adoting the preferred behaviour in their respective sub-
population.
As a start, in the two-subpopulation setting, at any time step t, the pro-
portion of susceptibles in the population can be subdivided in the following
three equivalent forms:























where the variables S with superscript 1 (or 2) are referred to as the suscep-
tibles that belong to subpopulation 1 (or 2), whereas the variables S with
a letter n (or a) in the subscript represent the proportion of susceptibles
adopting normal (or altered) behaviour. We assume that the subpopulation
of susceptibles does not change throughout the course of epidemic outbreak,
i.e. no migrations between subpopulations. Since we focus on the evolution of
strategy (or behaviour) frequency distributions under the mechanism of nat-
ural selection (and imitation dynamics, as discussed in the next subsection),
we denote the proportion of susceptibles adopting the preferred behaviour






















































(1− p(t))S1(t) + q(t)S2(t)
]
I(t)
= −β [p(t) + α(1− p(t))]S1(t)I(t)− β [(1− q(t)) + αq(t)]S2(t)I(t).
(3.2)
Let f = f1 represent the (relative) power of subpopulation 1 and (1 −
f) = f2 the power of subpopulation 2, in which the relative power not only
represents the relative size of the subpopulation, but also reflects how much
influence a subpopulation has on the strategy choice of individuals [47], and
essentially the sizes of both subpopulations evolve in a constant ratio [19]. At
any time step t, we assume that the total number of susceptible individuals is
subdivided into subpopulation 1 and subpopulation 2 according to its relative
power. Thus, S1(t) = f S(t) and S2(t) = (1−f)S(t). Equation (3.2) becomes
dS(t)
dt
= −β [p(t) + α(1− p(t))] fS(t)I(t)− β [(1− q(t)) + αq(t)] (1− f)S(t)I(t)
= −β [fp(t) + αf(1− p(t)) + (1− f)(1− q(t)) + α(1− f)q(t)]S(t)I(t).
(3.3)
From differential calculus, the evolution of the frequency of preferred strat-




































= βp(t) [fp(t) + αf(1− p(t)) + (1− f)(1− q(t)) + α(1− f)q(t)− 1] I(t).
(3.5a)
Similarly, the evolution of the frequency of preferred strategy in subpopulation
2 is given by
dq(t)
dt
= βq(t) [fp(t) + αf(1− p(t)) + (1− f)(1− q(t)) + α(1− f)q(t)− α] I(t).
(3.5b)
Both equations in (3.5) do not depend explicitly on the densities of suscep-
tible individuals but only on their strategy frequencies. This is aligned with
the idea of replicator dynamics even with the restriction in the two-population
evolutionary dynamics developed in [20]. However, the density of infectious
individuals has an equal effect on all strategies frequency in a given subpop-
ulation.
Combining equations (3.3) and (3.5) into the SIR epidemic model, the
“natural” selection process for behavioural distributions in two subpopula-
tions with different preferences (normal against altered behaviour) embedded












= βp(t) [X(t)− 1] I(t), (3.6d)
dq(t)
dt
= βq(t) [X(t)− α] I(t), (3.6e)
where
X(t) = fp(t) + αf(1− p(t)) + (1− f)(1− q(t)) + α(1− f)q(t). (3.6f)
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in which X reflects the population average reduction of force of infection
which is determined by the strategy frequency and the relative power in both
subpopulations as well as the pre-determined α value. Hereinafter, the in-
dependent variable t is dropped for simplicity of notation. We assume that
individual behavioural response on disease outbreak (i.e. whether to adopt
normal or altered behaviour) is spontaneous and hence the demographic pa-
rameters (birth and death rate) are not included in the model. Also, indi-
viduals in the system (3.6) do not use cost-benefit analysis in changing their
strategy in natural selection model.
By setting f = 1 (resp. f = 0), the two-subpopulation natural selection
model (3.6) reduces to the one-subpopulation model. In the case in which only
subpopulation 1 (resp. 2) exists, only equation (3.6d) (resp. equation (3.6e))
is relevant. After some simplifications, we obtain dp
dt
= p(1 − p)(αβI − βI)
(resp. dq
dt
= q(1− q)(βI − αβI)). Since αβI − βI < 0 (resp. βI − αβI > 0),
the fraction of S1n (resp. S
2
a) is always decreasing (resp. increasing) in the
natural selection process.
3.2.2 The two-subpopulation game-dynamical replica-
tor equations with strategy change through cost-
benefit considerations and social group pressure
Apart from driven by natural selection, we assume that individuals also
change their strategy in “normal against altered behaviour game” through
imitations. To take into account the heterogeneity of individuals’ strategy
adoptions in different subpopulations (or groups), our imitation dynamics is
modelled based on the modelling frameworks in [47, 48]. The payoff matrices
and game-dynamical replicator equations appeared in [47, 48] are given in
details in Appendix A.
We model our imitation dynamics by taking a combination of cost-benefit
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Table 3.1: The 2×2 payoff matrices for the two-subpopulation “normal against
altered behaviour game”
The payoff matrices for individuals belonging to subpopulation 1.
(i) A11ij , within-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal normal (preferred) altered
agent’s normal (preferred) −c1,n + Ω1n + δ1p −c1,n + Ω1n
behaviour altered −c1,a −c1,a + δ1(1− p)
(ii) A12ij , between-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal normal altered (preferred)
agent’s normal (preferred) −C1,n + Ω1n + δ12p(1− q) −C1,n + Ω1n
behaviour altered −C1,a −C1,a + δ12(1− p)q
The payoff matrices for individuals belonging to subpopulation 2.
(i) A22ij , within-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal normal altered (preferred)
agent’s normal −c2,n + δ2(1− q) −c2,n
behaviour altered (preferred) −c2,a + Ω2a −c2,a + Ω2a + δ2q
(ii) A21ij , between-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal normal (preferred) altered
agent’s normal −C2,n + δ21(1− q)p −C2,n
behaviour altered (preferred) −C2,a + Ω2a −C2,a + Ω2a + δ21q(1− p)
analysis and social point of view. We construct the 2× 2 payoff matrices for
the two-subpopulation “normal against altered behaviour game”, as given in
Table 3.1.
Imitation driven by cost-benefit considerations
In normal and altered strategy game, the cost incurred to a player (individ-
ual, or agent) adopting a certain strategy will only depend on the type of
strategies chosen, but not on the interaction partner’s strategy. Hence, we
use the notations similar to those employed by [92] in representing costs in
different behavioural groups. Specifically, in Table 3.1, we use the lowercase
letter cu,v to represent the relevant costs incurred for within-subpopulation
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strategy interactions and the uppercase letter Cu,v for between-subpopulation
interactions, in which the first subscript u ∈ {1, 2} denotes the subpopulation
where the focal agent belongs to, and the second subscript v ∈ {n, a} denotes
their adopted strategies, i.e. the normal or altered behaviour. We admit that
the cost for normal behaviour may sound not realistic, and use it here simply
to ensure the elements of payoff matrices have non-zero payoff.
This allow us to assume different costs for normal and/or altered behaviour
in different subpopulations and types of strategy interaction. For instance,
for within-subpopulation strategy interactions, we could assume that the per-
ceived costs of normal behaviour are likely to be lower in subpopulation 1
than in subpopulation 2, i.e. c1,n < c2,n since normal behaviour is preferred
(or favourable) in subpopulation 1. Similarly, we could also assume that the
perceived costs of any strategies for between-subpopulation interactions are
likely to be greater than their corresponding within-subpopulation interac-
tions, i.e. Cu,v > cu,v.
To reflect the incompatible preferences, we assume that one of the two
strategies in a particular subpopulation is more attractive than the other
strategy. For each individual, if one strategy is more attractive, he/she will
be better paid if that strategy is chosen [24]. Hence, unlike [47, 48], the in-
compatible preferences in our proposed model are reflected by adding an extra
profit Ω for individuals choosing the preferred strategy in their respective sub-
population, as in [24]. We further denote that the extra profit for individuals
adopting preferred normal (resp. altered) behaviour in subpopulation 1 (resp.
2) as Ω1n (resp. Ω
2
a). Since altered behaviour is beneficial in reducing the force
of infection, we assume that Ω2a ≥ Ω1n.
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Imitation under social group pressure
In strategy interactions, it can be phenomenologically assumed that individu-
als apply group pressure to support conformity and discourage dis-coordinated
behaviour. In the one-population game, this could be modelled by subtract-
ing a non-negative value δ from the off-diagonal payoffs or by adding δ to
the diagonal elements in the payoff matrix [47, 48]. In the two-subpopulation
game, it is possible to assign different magnitudes of group pressure for intra-
(i.e. δ1, δ2) and inter-subpopulation (i.e. δ12, δ21) strategy interactions, as
given in Table 3.1.
By taking the approach similar to [70], the group pressure in our proposed
model is included in such a way that individuals playing a strategy receive an
additional payoff in proportion to how many others in the subpopulation are
also playing that strategy. Note that the average group pressures imposing
on the coordinated behaviour (i.e. the agent and his / her interaction partner
are from different subpopulation, but both display the same behaviour) in
inter-subpopulation interactions are assumed to be equal, i.e. δ12 = δ21, and
we have δ12p(1− q) = δ21(1− q)p and δ12(1− p)q = δ21q(1− p).
Since there are no good epidemiological reasons to claim that the confor-
mity rewards will surplus the cost of altered and/or normal behaviour, δ has
to be chosen carefully, small enough to keep the payoffs in negative value. If
the group pressure is too large, the outcomes of a game can be transformed
[47].
The integration of cost-benefit considerations and social group pres-
sure in deriving the imitation dynamics of two-subpopulation model
To derive the imitation dynamics for our two-subpopulation model, the same
approach and simplifications presented in Appendix A are used, together with
two further simplifications. Firstly, we set c1,a = C1,a = c2,a = C2,a ≡ Ca and
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c1,n = C1,n = c2,n = C2,n ≡ Cn to assume that the cost of altered (resp.
normal) behaviour neither depends on the subpopulation an individual be-
longs to, nor the intra- and inter-subpopulation interactions. Secondly, we
set δ1 = δ2 = δ12 = δ21 ≡ δ0 for the similar assumptions. These assumptions
could be easily relaxed, however, by doing so, there would be nine more pa-
rameters to deal with. Understanding the imitation dynamics with all these
parameters being varied is not really feasible.
With the above two simplifications and after some algebraic manipula-
























Cn − Ca + Ω2a + δ0(q(1− p)2 − (1− q)p2)
])
. (3.7b)
where κ is a proportionality constant denoting how willing individuals are
to switch to new strategy based on the payoff difference. In a nutshell, the
system (3.7) implies that the susceptibles decide whether to adopt normal or
altered behaviour by weighting the inconvenient cost of health protective ac-
tions against their associated risk of infection under the influence of both intra-
and inter-group (or subpopulation) pressure. Similar to the one-population
model of [70], δ0(2p− 1) and δ0(2q − 1) are the intra-group pressure imposed
on subpopulation 1 and 2, respectively.
We take a closer look on the quadratic terms appeared in the expressions
of the inter-group pressure in (3.7). The inter-group pressure can be expanded
in the following way:
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(a) Subpopulation 1 (b) Subpopulation 2
Figure 3.1: The comparison of the magnitude of intra- and inter-group pres-
sure.
p(1− q)2 − (1− p)q2 = p(1− q)× (1− q)− (1− p)q × q
≡ Pr(S1n meetS2n)× S2n − Pr(S1a meetS2a)× S2a, (3.8a)
q(1− p)2 − (1− q)p2 = q(1− p)× (1− p)− (1− q)p× p
≡ Pr(S2a meetS1a)× S1a − Pr(S2n meetS1n)× S1n. (3.8b)
The first (resp. second) probability (Pr) in equation (3.8a) can be inter-
preted as the inter-group pressure of the coordinated normal (resp. altered)
behaviour imposed by susceptibles with normal (resp. altered) behaviour in
subpopulation 2 on susceptibles with normal (resp. altered) behaviour in sub-
population 1. By only considering equation (3.8a), if the inter-group pressure
of the coordinated normal behaviour is greater (resp. smaller) than the inter-
group pressure of the coordinated altered behaviour in inter-subpopulation
strategy interactions, the normal behaviour spreads (resp. does not spread)
in subpopulation 1. Equation (3.8b) could also be interpreted in the similar
way.
However, in the two-subpopulation setting, the players of the game are al-
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lowed to have both intra- and inter-subpopulation strategy interactions. The
combined effects of both intra- and inter-group pressure on a particular sub-
population could be rather complex. Hence, we plot the magnitudes of the
intra- and inter-group pressure acting on subpopulations 1 and 2, respectively,
for 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, with δ0 = 0.1 in Figure 3.1. The colour surfaces are the vari-
ations in the inter-group pressure over all possible values of p and q, whereas
the grey planes are the intra-group pressure. Since we set δ0 = 0.1, the range
of either intra- or inter-group pressure is in the interval [−0.1, 0.1]. We ob-
serve that when both p and q are small (i.e. p, q < 0.5), the inter-group (resp.
intra-group) pressure has positive (resp. negative) effect on the conformity of
the preferred strategy in each subpopulation. On the other hand, when both
p and q are large (i.e. p, q > 0.5), the inter-group pressure discourages confor-
mity of the preferred strategy in each subpopulation whereas the intra-group
pressure stimulates it. In other words, when p and q are either both small or
both large, the effect of social group pressure acting on both subpopulations
are identical.
However, when p is large (i.e. S1n is majority in subpopulation 1) and q
is small (i.e. S2a is minority in subpopulation 2), the inter-group pressure im-
posed by subpopulation 2 on subpopulation 1 reaches its peak (Figure 3.1(a)).
This is because of Pr(S1n meetS
2
n)×S2n  Pr(S1a meetS2a)×S2a. Then, we have
p(1 − q)2 − (1 − p)q2 > 0, and the magnitude of this inter-group pressure is
even higher than its corresponding intra-group pressure. For this situation to
occur in subpopulation 2, p needs to be small and q needs to be large (Fig-
ure 3.1(b)). This proportion of strategy frequency corresponds to a scenario
whereby the preferred strategy has become the social norm in the population.
And, both intra- and inter-group pressures stimulate more individuals follow-
ing social norm.
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The perceived risk of disease prevalence and the speed of two dif-
ferent dynamics
Let the payoffs (Π) associated with adopting normal and altered behaviour
are
Πn(τ) = −mnM(τ) ≡ −Cn, (3.9a)
Πa(τ) = −k0 −maM(τ) ≡ −Ca, (3.9b)
as defined in [74], where mn > ma. The parameters mn and ma are related
to the risk of developing disease symptoms induced by individuals with nor-
mal and altered behaviours, respectively, while k0 represents the additional
cost of any self-initiated pre-cautionary measure (e.g. social distancing, less
traveling, avoidence of congregated places etc.). M(τ) is the perceived risk of
disease prevalence. τ is the time unit for imitation process which has different
time scales from the disease transmission, t = ετ . Since payoff maximization
is also cost minimization, we also denote two time-dependent payoffs as the
cost of normal behaviour, Cn and the cost of altered behaviour, Ca, respec-
tively, in equations (3.9).
Assume that the susceptibles have full information on disease prevalence,
i.e. M(τ) = I(τ), which is certainly not realistic. We made this assumption
in order to use minimal number of equations in our proposed model. Thus,
the expression Ca − Cn in equation (3.7a) can be expressed as


































The complete model of SIR epidemics coupled with two-subpopulation
natural selection process and imitation dynamics
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= βp(X − 1)I + p(1− p)ρ×
(
f [k(1−mI) + Ωn + δ(2p− 1)]
+ (1− f)
[





= βq(X − α)I + q(1− q)ρ×
(
(1− f) [−k(1−mI) + Ωa + δ(2q − 1)]
+ f
[
−k(1−mI) + Ωa + δ(q(1− p)2 − (1− q)p2)
])
, (3.11e)
where X = fp+αf(1−p)+(1−f)(1−q)+α(1−f)q. The parameter ρ gives
the speed of the imitation process with respect to the disease transmission
process as well as a measure of how willing the players are to switch to new
strategy based on the payoff difference. If ρ = 0, individuals in system (3.11)
do not include the cost-benefit analysis in changing their strategies, and sys-
tem (3.11) reduces to the natural selection model.
As the direct consequences of following the multi-population game dynam-
ical modelling framework in [47, 48], the two subpopulations in our proposed
model face a conflict of interest by having different preferences in adopt-
ing normal or altered strategy. Therefore, the ± sign in +k(1 − mI) and
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−k(1−mI) reflects that the evolution of strategy frequency under the cost-
benefit considerations in one subpopulation is the opposite of the outcome
on another subpopulation. In a way, this model the common belief that an
increase (resp. a decrease) of the cost of adopting altered behaviour will drive
more susceptibles in subpopulation 1 (resp. 2) adopting normal (resp. al-
tered) behaviour.
3.3 Local stability analysis
In this section, we present the local stability analysis for the model with no
extra benefit, i.e. Ωn = Ωa = 0. At the disease free equilibrium (DFE),




= p(1− p)ρU(p, q) ≡ u(p, q), (3.12a)
dq
dt
= q(1− q)ρ V (p, q) ≡ v(p, q), (3.12b)
where
U(p, q) = f [k + δ(2p− 1)] + (1− f)
[
k + δ(p(1− q)2 − (1− p)q2)
]
, (3.12c)
V (p, q) = (1− f) [−k + δ(2q − 1)] + f
[




We first find all the possible fixed (or stationary) points of the system








= 0 ⇔ q = 0, 1 or V (p, q) = 0.
From p = 0, 1 and q = 0, 1, we obtain the first four fixed points which are
located at four respective corners of the pq-plane. Also, another four fixed
points on the boundary of the pq-plane can be obtained by setting q = 0 or 1
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(resp. p = 0 or 1) and solving U(p, q) = 0 (resp. V (p, q) = 0) for the p (resp.
q) value. Apart from that, if there exist 0 < p, q < 1 values that satisfy the
two equations U(p, q) = 0 and V (p, q) = 0 simultaneously, then the system
of equations (3.12) does have fixed point on the inner part of the pq-plane.
That is, the system (3.12) could possibly have four to nine fixed points in total.
To determine the stability of the system around the fixed points (pl, ql),












J11 = (1− 2pl)ρU(pl, ql) + pl(1− pl)ρ
[
2δf + (1− f)δ
(
(1− ql)2 + q2l
)]
,
J12 = pl(1− pl)ρ [2(1− f) δ (2plql − pl − ql)] ,
J21 = ql(1− ql)ρ [2fδ (2plql − pl − ql)] ,
J22 = (1− 2ql)ρV (pl, ql) + ql(1− ql)ρ
[
2δ(1− f) + fδ
(




At the fixed point (pl, ql), the eigenvalues (i.e. ηl and νl) of the Jacobian
matrix are given by the determinant below:∣∣∣∣∣∣J11 − ηl J12J21 J22 − νl
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0, (3.15a)
which gives the characteristic equation,
(J11 − ηl)(J22 − νl)− J12J21 = 0. (3.15b)
From equations (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain the solution of the eigenvalues
at all possible points, as listed in the Table 3.2.
From the results given in Table 3.2, we can determine the nature (the
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Table 3.2: The fixed points and their associated eigenvalues when Ωn,Ωa = 0
l Fixed point (pl, ql) Associated eigenvalues, ηl and νl
1 (0, 0) η1 : −ρ(fδ − k)
ν1 : −ρ(k + (1− f)δ)
2 (1, 0) η2 : −ρ(k + δ)
ν2 : −ρ(k + δ)
3 (0, 1) η3 : ρ(k − δ)
ν3 : ρ(k − δ)
4 (1, 1) η4 : −ρ(fδ + k)




, 0) η5 : p5(1− p5)ρ(fδ + δ)




, 1) η6 : p6(1− p6)ρ(fδ + δ)
ν6 : −ρ((1− f)(−k + δ) + f(−k + δ(1− p6)2))
7 (1, q7 =
k+δ
2δ−δf ) η7 : −ρ(f(k + δ) + (1− f)(k + δ(1− q7)
2))
ν7 : q7(1− q7)ρ(2(1− f)δ + δf)
8 (0, q8 =
k+δ(1−f)
2δ−δf ) η8 : ρ(f(k − δ) + (1− f)(k − δq
2
8))
ν8 : q8(1− q8)ρ(2(1− f)δ + δf)
stability state) of each of the fixed points based on the solution of the two
eigenvalues at the point. If both eigenvalues are negative, the fixed point is a
stable node, for example, at the point (p2, q2) = (1, 0), η2 and ν2 are always
negative and hence the point is always a stable node. If the eigenvalues are
both positive at a fixed point, then the point is an unstable point; and if the
eigenvalues have opposite sign then the point is a saddle point. For example,
at the point (p3, q3) = (0, 1), η3 < 0 and ν3 < 0 if k < δ and η3 > 0 and ν3 > 0
if k > δ. So, the point is stable if k < δ or otherwise unstable. At the point
(1, 1), η4 < 0 and ν4 > 0 if k > (1− f)δ and so this point is a saddle point if
k > (1 − f)δ. It can be seen that when δ → 0, the fixed points (pl, ql) with
l = 5, 6, 7, 8 do not exist.
Similarly, for the two subpopulation models with extra profit given to sus-
ceptibles adopting the preferred behaviour, i.e. Ωn,Ωa 6= 0, by carrying out
a similar local stability analysis, we obtain the fixed points and its associ-









2δ−δf , and q8 =
k−Ωa+δ(1−f)
2δ−δf . It is interesting to note that by adding
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Table 3.3: The fixed points and their associated eigenvalues when Ωn,Ωa 6= 0
l Fixed point Associated eigenvalues, ηl and νl
(pl, ql)
1 (0, 0) η1 : −ρ(fδ − k − Ωn)
ν1 : −ρ(k − Ωa + (1− f)δ)
2 (1, 0) η2 : −ρ(k + Ωn + δ)
ν2 : −ρ(k − Ωa + δ)
3 (0, 1) η3 : ρ(k + Ωn − δ)
ν3 : ρ(k − Ωa − δ)
4 (1, 1) η4 : −ρ(fδ + Ωn + k)
ν4 : −ρ(−k + Ωa + (1− f)δ)
5 (p5, 0) η5 : p5(1− p5)ρ(fδ + δ)
ν5 : ρ((1− f)(−k + Ωa − δ) + f(−k + Ωa − δp25))
6 (p6, 1) η6 : p6(1− p6)ρ(fδ + δ)
ν6 : −ρ((1− f)(−k + Ωa + δ) + f(−k + Ωa + δ(1− p6)2))
7 (1, q7) η7 : −ρ(f(k + Ωn + δ) + (1− f)(k + Ωn + δ(1− q7)2))
ν7 : q7(1− q7)ρ(2(1− f)δ + δf)
8 (0, q8) η8 : ρ(f(k + Ωn − δ) + (1− f)(k + Ωa − δq28))
ν8 : q8(1− q8)ρ(2(1− f)δ + δf)
the extra profit into the model, it affects the stability of the fixed points sub-
stantially. For instance, if Ωa is sufficiently large, i.e. Ωa > k+δ, then ν2 > 0.
Thus, it is possible to have the fixed point (1, 0) as a saddle point, rather than
a stable node as in the case with no extra profit.
3.4 Results and discussion
3.4.1 The two-subpopulation model with no extra profit
for adopting the preferred behaviour (i.e. Ωn =
Ωa = 0)
The key parameter which characterizes the speed of the imitation process
with respect to the “natural” selection process is ρ. By setting ρ = 0 (Fig-
ure 3.2(a)), the imitation dynamic model is reduced to the “natural” selec-
tion model. Without the influence of imitation, the altered behaviour in
subpopulation 2 grows in a modest scale, whereas the normal behaviour
in subpopulation 1 declines slightly in a single epidemic outbreak for all
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(a) ρ = 0 (b) ρ = 1.5, δ = 0.001
(c) ρ = 1.5, δ = 0.1 (d) ρ = 1.5, δ = 0.4
Figure 3.2: The (p(t), q(t)) trajectories for the natural selection model and
the imitation dynamic model with different magnitudes of group pressure δ.
initial conditions (p(0), q(0)). The initial conditions (p(0), q(0)) can be re-
garded as the previous history of proportion of susceptibles adopting nor-
mal and altered strategies in both subpopulations, which is indeed the ex-
isting preferences of particular subpopulation. We simulate all results by
using 0.1 ≤ p(0), q(0) ≤ 0.9 in order to make sure that all pure strategies of
the imitation game are present in the initial subpopulations. In Figure 3.2,
{•, ◦,×} denotes {stable, unstable, saddle} point, respectively. Unless oth-
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erwise specified, the combination of parameter values (β, γ, α, ρ, f,m, k, δ) =
(0.625, 0.25, 0.86, 1.5, 0.5, 0.1, 0.025, 0.1) is used for all simulations in this chap-
ter, together with the initial conditions S(0) = 0.95, I(0) = 0.05. This pair




is the R0 for airborne droplet transmission, such as influenza (R0 = 2 to 3)
[64]. The simulations end at 80 time steps, with 4t = 1.
By incorporating social group pressure and cost-benefit analysis into the
imitation dynamics of the two-subpopulation model, i.e. set ρ > 0, there exist
four basins of attraction in the game dynamics leading to four fixed points, re-
spectively, provided δ > k, as shown in Figure 3.2(c) and (d). The stationary
solution (p, q) = (1, 0) (resp. (0, 1)) means that all individuals finally adopt
the behaviour preferred in subpopulation 1 (resp. 2), meanwhile (p, q) = (1, 1)
(resp. (0, 0)) corresponds to the case where both subpopulations will (resp.
will not) end up with subpopulation-specific norms (i.e. every subpopulation
just does what it likes [48]). By comparing Figure 3.2(a) to other figures in
Figure 3.2, we conclude that without the imitation dynamics, the “natural”
selection can only drive a small portion of susceptibles to switch their strate-
gies, i.e. the expected temporal change of behavioural pattern of susceptibles
in both subpopulations is minimal. By including the imitation dynamics with
the social group pressure, the behavioural pattern of susceptibles will eventu-
ally end up in one of the four specific directions.
The existence of four basins of attraction can be explained qualitatively
as follows. When both p(0) and q(0) are small, i.e. the proportions of the
preferred behaviour in their respective subpopulation are low, from the per-
spective of any susceptibles adopted the preferred behaviour, the impact of
intra-group pressure has on strategy switching is smaller than the inter-group
pressure. In other words, susceptibles with preferred behaviour in either sub-
population will have higher probability of meeting one other susceptible with
the coordinated behaviour from another subpopulation than from the same
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subpopulation. For any specific pairs of p and q, the effect of the intra-group
pressure is always larger than the inter-group pressure, this results in a fall
of the preferred behaviour in both subpopulations. Thus, non-preference be-
haviour survives in their respective subpopulation and everybody behaves
non-coorperatively in the end. For large p(0) and q(0), the proportion of
the preferred behaviour in their respective subpopulation is high. The intra-
group pressure thus has a considerate effect on stimulating more susceptibles
adopting the preferred behaviour. Hence, both subpopulations will be even-
tually occupied by susceptibles with their respective subpopulation preferred
behaviour. For initial conditions with large (resp. small) p(0) but small (resp.
large) q(0), the majority of susceptibles in both subpopulations are with nor-
mal (resp. altered) behaviour, and both intra- and inter-group pressure in
subpopulations will drive more susceptibles to adopt the normal (resp. al-
tered) behaviour. Therefore, trajectories (p(t), q(t)) evolve toward the fixed
point (1, 0) (resp. (0, 1)).
For the imitation dynamic model with the magnitude of group pressure
δ = 0.001 (Figure 3.2(b)), almost all (p(t), q(t)) flow lines move towards the
fixed point (1, 0). All susceptibles are expected to end up with normal be-
haviour as the epidemic outbreak is over. However, if a large δ value is used,
for instance δ = 0.4 (Figure 3.2(d)), the effect of group pressure is more pro-
nounced and the trajectories (p(t), q(t)) follow a more distinct path towards
their respective fixed points.
Based on the fixed points and eigenvalues given in Table 3.2, we examine
the nature of each fixed point in Figure 3.2(b) and 3.2(c) by evaluating its as-
sociated eigenvalues, as given in Table 3.4. The numerical simulation results
as shown in Figure 3.2 are in good agreement with the results of the local
stability analysis in Section 3.3. With the combination of parameter values
used in Figure 3.2(b), there are no real solutions within the range [0, 1] for the
simultaneous equations U(p9, q9) = 0 and V (p9, q9) = 0 (i.e. equations (3.12c)
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Table 3.4: The fixed points and their associated eigenvalues for Figure 3.2 (b)
and 3.2(c)
l Fixed point Figure 3.2(b) Figure 3.2(c)
(pl, ql) ηl νl Type of ηl νl Type of
point point
1 (0, 0) 0.037 -0.038 SP -0.038 -0.113 stable
2 (1, 0) -0.039 -0.039 stable -0.188 -0.188 stable
3 (0, 1) 0.036 0.036 unstable -0.113 -0.113 stable
4 (1, 1) -0.038 0.037 SP -0.113 -0.038 stable
5 (0.167, 0) Note: All p5, p6, q7 and q8 0.031 -0.115 SP
6 (0.5, 1) values are out of range [0, 1]. 0.056 -0.056 SP
7 (1, 0.833) Therefore, no fixed points on -0.115 0.031 SP
8 (0, 0.5) the boundary of the pq-plane. -0.056 0.056 SP
9 (0.36, 0.64) No inner fixed points. 0.029 0.059 unstable
SP = saddle point
(a) α = 0.78 (b) α = 0.94
Figure 3.3: The time evolution of SIR dynamics with different reductions of
force of infection, α.
and (3.12d)). However, for Figure 3.2(c), there exists one real solution which
gives the inner fixed point (p9, q9) = (0.36, 0.64).
As suggested in [74], the reduction of force of infection received by al-
tered susceptible is in the range of α ∈ (0.78, 0.94). Hence, by taking its
lowest and highest value, the time evolutions of the SIR dynamics with all
possible initial conditions (p(0), q(0)) are plotted in Figure 3.3. A lower α
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(a) f = 0.5 (b) f = 0.25
(c) f = 0.75 (d) f = 0.99
Figure 3.4: The epidemic final size with different (relative) power of subpop-
ulation, f .
value implies greater benefits to altered susceptibles and results in consider-
able variance in the epidemic final sizes. On the other hand, for α = 0.94, the
altered susceptibles do not reduce much of their probability of being infected
and the epidemic final sizes become more consistent with all initial conditions
(p(0), q(0)) considered. Hence, we use the median value α = 0.86 throughout
the simulations in this chapter.
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Instead of the typical SIR time evolution presented in Figure 3.3, we illus-
trate the correlation between the previous history of proportion of strategies
in both subpopulations and the epidemic final size, with α = 0.86 and δ = 0.4
in Figure 3.4. When the two subpopulations are equally strong (i.e. f = 0.5),
the severity of the epidemic outbreak is low (resp. high) if the initial pro-
portion of susceptible with preferred altered behaviour is high (resp. low)
(Figure 3.4(a)). However, if we incorporate the heterogeneity between sub-
populations, the epidemic final sizes may be significantly changed. For the
scenario whereby the subpopulation 2 is stronger than subpopulation 1, if the
initial proportion of susceptibles with preferred altered behaviour is minority
in its subpopulation, the epidemic final sizes almost reach its peak regardless
of the initial proportion of susceptibles with preferred normal behaviour in
another subpopulation (Figure 3.4(b)).
In contrast, the epidemic final sizes are relatively high when the initial
proportion of susceptibles with normal behaviour in subpopulation 1 is domi-
nant, regardless the initial proportion of susceptibles with altered behaviour in
subpopulation 2, when subpopulation 1 is more powerful than subpopulation
2 (Figure 3.4(c)). It can thus be suggested that not only the heterogene-
ity among individuals but also the heterogeneity of subpopulations has an
important impact on the epidemic dynamics. If the more powerful subpop-
ulation prefers normal (resp. altered) behaviour and the initial proportion
of the preferred strategy is majority (resp. minority), the epidemic final size
is high regardless the initial proportion of the other subpopulation. Figure
3.4(d) highlights the scenario of population with single preference whereby
we purposely impose an extreme high relative strength on subpopulation 1
by setting f = 0.99. By doing so, the whole population can be regarded as
comprising of only one single group with normal behaviour as their prefer-
ence. Without heterogeneity between groups in a population, the epidemic
final sizes evolve smoothly as compared to the model of two subpopulations
with different relative strengths.
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(a) p(0) = 0.15, q(0) = 0.85 (b) p(0) = 0.85, q(0) = 0.85
(c) p(0) = 0.15, q(0) = 0.15 (d) p(0) = 0.85, q(0) = 0.15
Figure 3.5: The contour plots of the epidemic final size in parameter space
(δ, k).
As our two-subpopulation model incorporates both cost-benefit consid-
erations and social group pressure, each of these factors should be weighed
according to its relative impact on the epidemic final size. Hence, we ex-
plore the parameter space (δ, k) for δ ∈ [0.05, 0.4] and k ∈ [0.025, 0.2] for
four different initial proportions of strategies in two subpopulations in Fig-
ure 3.5. In particular, Figure 3.5(a) (resp. 3.5(d)) corresponds to the case
with high initial proportion of altered (resp. normal) susceptible in both sub-
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populations. The lowest epidemic final size in Figure 3.5(a) and the highest
in Figure 3.5(d), among four panels in Figure 3.5, again suggests that the
previous history of strategies adopted by susceptible in both subpopulations
has a significant effect on epidemic dynamics. Figure 3.5(b) and 3.5(c) show
similar results simply because both subpopulations are equally strong and the
proportions of susceptibles with altered and normal behaviour in the initial
population are quite compatible.
All panels in Figure 3.5 show that the increase of additional costs to those
adopting altered behaviour during epidemic outbreak would discourage peo-
ple to take up pre-cautionary health protective actions and hence results in
higher epidemic final size. For a specific cost of altered behaviour, the sever-
ity of epidemic outbreak could be reduced if the intensity of the social group
pressure increases (Figure 3.5(a) to 3.5(c)). However, interestingly, the social
group pressure could be a “double edged sword” if the initial proportions of
the normal behaviour susceptibles are already the majority in both subpopu-
lations. The increases of social group pressure acting on normal susceptibles
will give rise to higher epidemic final size (Figure 3.5(d)). This finding aligns
with that of [70], who identified that social norms could either support or
hinder immunization goals.
3.4.2 The two-subpopulation model with extra profit
for adopting the preferred behaviour (i.e. Ωn,Ωa 6=
0)
For the two-subpopulation model presented in Section 3.4.1, when the effect
of social group pressure is sufficiently large, the (p(t), q(t)) trajectories form
four basins of attraction. However, this social group pressure may be balanced
out by extra profit Ω given to individuals adopting the preferred strategy in
their respective subpopulation. Therefore, including the extra profit Ω results
in a variety of interesting game dynamics in which four basins of attraction
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(a) Ωn = 0.03, Ωa = 0.07 (b) Ωn = −0.08, Ωa = 0.08
Figure 3.6: Comparing the (p(t), q(t)) trajectories between the imitation pro-
cess with different extra profits.
could be reduced to only two (or three) basins of attraction. For instance,
with Ωn = 0.03 and Ωa = 0.07 (Figure 3.6(a)), both subpopulations end
up with subpopulation-specific norms (coexisting “subcultures”, as defined in
[47]) whenever the initial fractions p(0) and q(0) are not very different. With
Ωn = −0.08 and Ωa = 0.08 in which negative value of Ωn implies that for indi-
viduals in subpopulation 1, he/she will be punished if adopting the preferred
normal strategy, we find that all individuals in both subpopulations finally
adopt the preferred altered strategy in subpopulation 2 for most of the initial
conditions (p(0), q(0)) (Figure 3.6(b)). The location and stability of the fixed
points in Figure 3.6 are verified with the local stability analysis and are given
in Table 3.5.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We conclude this chapter with the following remarks.
(i) Without imitation dynamics, the “natural” selection drives only a small
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Table 3.5: The fixed points and their associated eigenvalues for Figure 3.6
Figure 3.6(a) Figure 3.6(b)
l (pl, ql) ηl νl Type of (pl, ql) ηl νl Type of
point point
1 (0, 0) 0.008 -0.008 SP (0, 0) -0.158 0.008 SP
2 (1, 0) -0.233 -0.083 stable (1, 0) -0.068 -0.067 stable
3 (0, 1) -0.068 -0.218 stable (0, 1) -0.233 -0.233 stable
4 (1, 1) -0.158 -0.143 stable (1, 1) 0.008 -0.158 SP
5 NA - - - (0.7, 0) 0.047 -0.029 SP
6 (0.3, 1) 0.047 -0.179 SP NA - - -
7 (1, 0.367) -0.188 0.052 SP (1, 0.3) -0.029 0.047 SP
8 (0, 0.033) 0.007 0.007 unstable NA – - -
SP = saddle point, NA = no answer
number of susceptibles switching their strategy.
(ii) By including sufficiently large magnitude of social group pressure in imi-
tation dynamics, there exist four basins of attraction for the behavioural
pattern of susceptibles in the two-subpopulation model.
(iii) With other parameter values fixed, the outcome of the strategy switching
depends on the initial proportion of susceptibles with normal and altered
strategies in both subpopulations.
(iv) There exists a correlation between the previous history of proportion of
strategies in both subpopulations and the epidemic final size.
(v) The increase of additional cost to the susceptibles with altered behaviour
discourages people from taking up pre-cautionary health protective ac-
tions and hence results in higher epidemic final size. For a specific cost









Behavioural factors play an important and crucial role in determining the
success of a voluntary vaccination programme for infectious diseases. Individ-
ual vaccination decisions are usually based on a complex balance of perceived
costs of vaccination and disease. The perceived cost of vaccination is highly
influenced by the perceived probability of vaccine complications (for instance,
the vaccine side effects (VSE)) and the degree of protection conferred by vac-
cines, which is closely related to the vaccine efficacy and vaccine failure. Both
the vaccine efficacy and vaccine failure will be termed as vaccine imperfection
in this chapter.
According to [109], the vaccine efficacy is defined as the theoretical success
rate whereas the vaccine efficiency is indeed the practical observed success in
preventing vaccinated individuals from getting infections. In reviewing the lit-
erature, it is not uncommon that the vaccine imperfections have been taken
into account for a more realistic modelling exercise in epidemiology, for in-
stance, in [65]. Imperfect vaccines always increase the critical vaccination
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threshold that may lead to disease eradication [40] simply because being vac-
cinated does not always confer vaccine-acquired immunity. Overall, vaccine
failure could arise in three aspects. First, vaccine may fail to generate immu-
nity in a fraction of people vaccinated, which is defined as vaccine failure in
take (“all-or-nothing”) [31, 59]. Second, vaccine may only offer partial protec-
tion to vaccinated individuals either in reducing an individual susceptibility
to infection or subsequent transmission if the individual becomes infected, as
well as speeding up recovery. Such vaccines permit vaccine failure in degree,
described as “leaky” in [50, 59]. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) [15] claims that if someone who has been vaccinated with chickenpox
vaccine does get the disease, it is usually very mild and they can recover faster
than those who are not vaccinated. Third, for many diseases, the vaccine-
(and disease-) acquired immunity wanes over time which is described as vac-
cine failure in duration [46, 59]. For instance, pertussis (whooping cough)
vaccines for adolescents and adults could protect about 7 out of 10 people in
the first year after getting vaccinated, but only fully protecting 3 or 4 out of
10 people in four years after getting the vaccine [16].
Since individuals are not vaccinated at the same time in voluntary vac-
cination, it is possible, therefore, that vaccinated individuals with fully pro-
tective vaccine-acquired immunity coexist with other vaccinated individuals
with partially protective vaccine-acquired immunity in the population. The
epidemic dynamics of this coexistence of fully and partially protected vacci-
nated individuals is well-captured in a SIRVS epidemic model extended with
two classes of vaccine-induced immunity [30], where vaccinated individuals
first have high vaccine-acquired immunity with full protection from infection
and their immunity wanes in two stages, from high to low immunity (where
individuals still have some partial protection) and from low to no immunity
following a gamma distribution. Apart from that, another two features in the
extended model in [30] are that the vaccine may reduce transmissibility and
accelerate recovery in breakthrough infections for vaccinated infected individ-
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uals. These make the model suitable for investigating the epidemic dynamics
with vaccine failure in degree and in duration.
It is possible to hypothesise that no one takes vaccination until the vaccine
is sufficiently efficient in protecting vaccinated individuals from infection, and
also, an increase in vaccine efficacy will boost vaccine uptake level. However,
in a population of self-interested individuals, high vaccine efficacy leads to
uptake drops due to free-riding effects [113]. When vaccine immunity wanes
slowly, vaccine coverage is expected to be low but stable [110]. This is because
when vaccines are able to provide long-term protection, the risk awareness
among individuals may be hard to maintain and this could lead to substan-
tial drop in vaccination coverage and is likely to result in severe infrequent
epidemics [105]. The imperfections of vaccine also increase the probability
of non-vaccinating and the overall cost of optimum vaccination strategy [87].
When the vaccination cost is higher than the threshold value for the vaccine
imperfection, vaccination behaviours do not spread across the population and
the disease could also invade in scale-free networks [13]. Another implication
of the vaccination confers partial immunity on vaccination behaviours is the
existence of multiple equilibria of vaccination rate in voluntary vaccination
program [79].
These findings suggest that a strong interplay between vaccine imperfec-
tion, vaccination coverage and disease dynamics arises. However, the findings
may be somewhat limited by the definition of vaccine efficacy in the above-
mentioned literatures whereby they are merely referred to the reduction of
susceptibility to infection. The impacts of several other characteristics of im-
perfect vaccines on individual vaccination decision-making remain unanswered
at present. Hence, in this chapter, we employ the SIRVS epidemic model with
two classes of vaccine-induced immunity and additional characteristics of im-
perfect vaccine (namely, the reduction of transmissibility and faster recovery)
in [30], together with the vaccination population games framework [79], to
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investigate the interplay between these characteristics of imperfect vaccines,
the relative cost of vaccination to infection, the force of infection, the individ-
ual and population vaccination rates.
In Section 4.2, the full SIRVS epidemic model with two classes of vaccine-
induced immunity is presented. Since models with imperfect vaccines exhibit
backward bifurcation [44], we then show that the SIRVS model with two
classes of vaccine-induced immunity undergoing backward bifurcation by us-
ing center manifold theory in Subsection 4.2.1. Subsection 4.2.2 concerns the
analysis of the effective reproduction number. Then the details of vaccina-
tion population games for two classes of vaccine-induced immunity model are
explored in Section 4.3. Results are discussed in Section 4.4 and some con-
cluding remarks are given in Section 4.5.
4.2 Analysis of the SIRVS epidemic model with
two classes of vaccine-induced immunity
The population-scale dynamics of the vaccination population games can be
described by the SIRVS model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity
in the extended model in [30]:
dS
dt
= Λ− λS − π̄S + ωRR + ωV V2 − µS,
dI
dt
= λS − γuI − µI,
dW
dt
= σλV2 − γvW − µW,
dR
dt
= γuI + γvW − ωRR− µR,
dV1
dt
= π̄S − γ1V1 − µV1,
dV2
dt
= γ1V1 − σλV2 − ωV V2 − µV2,
(4.1)
where Λ denotes the (constant) recruitment rate of susceptible corresponding
to births and immigration, and µ is the natural death rate of the population.
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The total population at time t, N(t), is divided into six mutually exclusive
subpopulations, namely susceptible (S), two compartments for respective two
classes of infected individuals (I and W ), recovered (R), two compartments
for respective two classes of vaccinated individuals (V1 and V2). Specifically,
those individuals in the V1 class are the vaccinated individuals with high
vaccine-induced immunity. They are fully protected from infection until their
vaccine-induced protection is reduced and they then move to the V2 class at
a rate γ1. While these vaccinated individuals reside in the V2 class, they only
gain low vaccine-induced immunity, i.e. partial protection provided by the
vaccine. When the breakthrough infection of individuals in the V2 class oc-
curs, they move to the vaccinated infected class, W at the rate σλ, where
0 ≤ σ < 1 is the relative risk of infection for vaccinated individuals in the V2
class compared to unvaccinated susceptible individuals, or simply the prob-
ability of vaccine failure in degree, with the vaccine efficacy given by 1 − σ.
Thus, it is assumed that the vaccine is regarded as fully effective to individuals
in the V1 class and imperfect to individuals in the V2 class. Meanwhile, the
unvaccinated susceptible individuals, S, move to the unvaccinated infected
class, I, at the rate λ.
The individuals in the I and W classes differ from two aspects resulted
from the imperfect vaccine. First, unlike the unvaccinated infected individuals
in the I class with disease transmissibility β, the vaccinated infected individu-
als in the W class can only transmit infection at a reduced rate θβ ≤ β, where
0 < θ ≤ 1 is a modification parameter that accounts for the reduced infec-
tiousness of vaccinated infected individuals. Therefore, the force of infection
of model (4.1) is given by λ = β I+θW
N
. Second, the vaccine may accelerate
recovery in breakthrough infections. Hence, the vaccinated infected individ-
uals will have faster recovery than the unvaccinated infected individuals, i.e.
γu < γv.
Since N(t) = S(t) + I(t) +W (t) +R(t) + V1(t) + V2(t), the rate of change
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of the total population in model (4.1) is given by dN
dt
= Λ− µN . At t→∞,
we have N → Λ
µ
. Hence, we assume Λ = µ so that the population size is
constant. The model (4.1) also takes into account two vaccine failures in du-
ration, namely vaccine- and disease-acquired immunity wanes at rate ωV and
ωR, respectively.
The model (4.1) has a disease-free equilibrium (DFE) given by
E0 = (S0, I0,W0, R0, V10, V20) = (S0, 0, 0, 0, V10, V20) where
S0 =
(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ)








ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1 + µ)(π̄ + µ)
.
(4.2)
Since the population is not completely susceptible and the vaccine efficacy
plays a crucial role in shaping the epidemic dynamics, we shall use the effec-
tive reproduction number, denoted by Rvac, instead of the basic reproduction
number, R0. In one class of infective epidemic model with vaccination, Rvac
measures the average number of new infective individuals generated by a
single infectious individual in a population where a certain fraction of the
susceptible population are vaccinated. However, since the model (4.1) has
two infective compartments (i.e. I and W ) with different infectivity, we em-










(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
[
(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθγ1π̄(γu + µ)




Following [103], Rvac represents the number of secondary infections, both un-
vaccinated and vaccinated, produced by an “index case”, distributed in both
I and W classes, with one part in I and σV20
S0
parts in W (for the detail of this
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interpretation, see Appendix B).
Let E∗ = (S∗, I∗, R∗,W ∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) be any endemic equilibrium point (EEP)




∗ + a0 = 0 (4.4)
where
a2 = σ(ωR + γu + µ)(γ1 + µ)(γv + µ), (4.5a)
a1 = σ(γu + µ)
[
γ1π̄(ωR + γv + µ) + (γv + µ)(ωR + µ)(γ1 + π̄ + µ)
]
+ (γ1 + µ)(γv + µ)
[
(ωV + µ)(ωR + γu + µ)− βσ(ωR + µ)
]
, (4.5b)
a0 = (ωR + µ)(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
[




In epidemic models with imperfect vaccines, there are two types of tran-
scritical bifurcation at Rvac = 1, namely forward and backward bifurcation
[14]. From the epidemiological perspective, it is not enough to only reduce
the Rvac to less than unity to eliminate a disease if backward bifurcation oc-
curs. As imperfect vaccine is one of the causes for backward bifurcation [44],
we first show that backward bifurcation occurs in the SIRVS epidemic model
with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity by using the center manifold
theory [14, 30], as given in Theorem 2.1.
4.2.1 Center manifold analysis near the disease-free equi-
librium
We explore the backward bifurcation using the center manifold theory (see
Section 2.3.3) in the following four simple steps.
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Step 1: Show that one of the eigenvalues for the Jacobian matrix
of the model at DFE is zero when β = β∗.
The Jacobian matrix of model (4.1) at the DFE is given below.
J =

−π̄ − µ −βS0 −βθS0 ωR 0 ωV
0 βS0 − γu − µ βθS0 0 0 0
0 σβV20 σβθV20 − γv − µ 0 0 0
0 γu γv −ωR − µ 0 0
π̄ 0 0 0 −γ1 − µ 0
0 −σβV20 −σβθV20 0 γ1 −ωV − µ

(4.6)
The Jacobian matrix (4.6) has the following eigenvalues:
λ1 = −µ, (4.7a)

















(S0 + σθV20)2β2 − 2(γu − γv)(S0 − σθV20)β + (γu − γv)2.
(4.7d)
Since all the parameter values are non-negative, λ1 and λ2 are always negative
while λ3,4 have negative real part. Let β = β
∗ be the disease transmission rate
that makes the effective reproduction numberRvac equal to 1. By substituting
β = β∗ =
(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
(γv + µ)S0 + σθV20(γu + µ)
=
(γu + µ)(γv + µ) [ωV γ1 + (π̄ + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ)]
(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθγ1π̄(γu + µ)
(4.8)
into equation (4.7d), λ5,6 can be simplified as λ5 = 0 and
λ6 = −
(γv + µ)
2S0 + (γu + µ)
2σθV20
(γv + µ)S0 + (γu + µ)σθV20
< 0,
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since the initial conditions S0 and V20 as well as the parameters γu, γv, σ, θ,
µ are all non-negative. That is, at β = β∗, the Jacobian matrix (4.6) at DFE
has a simple eigenvalue 0 and all other eigenvalues have negative real parts.
Therefore, the center manifold theory can be used to analyse the dynamics of
the model near β = β∗.
By setting β = β∗, the DFE is locally stable when β < β∗ (⇔ λ5 < 0)
and locally unstable when β > β∗ (⇔ λ5 > 0). Therefore, the critical value
β = β∗ is a bifurcation value.
Step 2: Obtain the left and right eigenvector associated with the
zero eigenvalue.
The Jacobian matrix (4.6) at DFE and β = β∗ has the left eigenvector
v = [v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6] , (4.9)
where v1 = v4 = v5 = v6 = 0, v2 = γv + µ and v3 = θ(γu + µ). Furthermore,
it has a right eigenvector




















2 (γ1 + µ) + ωV σπ̄γ1
]









m1 = ωV γ1 + (π̄ + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ),
m2 =
ωR [γu(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + γvσπ̄γ1(γu + µ)]
(γu + µ)(ωR + µ)
.
Since the elements of eigenvector v and w must satisfy the equality v ·w = 1
[10], using equations (4.9) and (4.10), we have v2w2 + v3w3 = 1 which gives
w3 =
σπ̄γ1(γu + µ)
(γv + µ)2(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθπ̄γ1(γu + µ)2
. (4.11)
Step 3: Compute all the mixed derivatives for the bifurcation coef-
ficients a and b.
By using the transformation S = x1, I = x2, W = x3, R = x4, V1 = x5 and
V2 = x6, so that N =
∑6







= f1 = Λ− λx1 − π̄x1 + ωRx4 + ωV x6 − µx1,
dx2
dt
= f2 = λx1 − γux2 − µx2,
dx3
dt
= f3 = σλx6 − γvx3 − µx3,
dx4
dt
= f4 = γux2 + γvx3 − ωRx4 − µx4,
dx5
dt
= f5 = π̄x1 − γ1x5 − µx5,
dx6
dt
= f6 = γ1x5 − σλx6 − ωV x6 − µx6,
(4.12)
where λ = β x2+θx3∑6
j=1 xj
. The bifurcation coefficients in this six compartmental


















Since v2 6= 0 and v3 6= 0 in (4.9), we only need to find the mixed derivatives






































and all other mixed derivatives for f3 are zero.
Step 4: Compute a and b.
By substituting the elements of eigenvectors v and w as well as the respective

















= 2β(w2 + θw3) [(γv + µ)w1 + σθ(γu + µ)w6]
=
2βw23 [(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθπ̄γ1(γu + µ)]
µ(σπ̄γ1)2(γu + µ) [ωV γ1 + (π̄ + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ)]
×

−σθπ̄γ1(γu + µ)(γv + µ)(γ1 + µ) [ωV + µ+ σ(π̄ + µ)]
+ [(ωV + µ)(γv + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθπ̄γ1(γu + µ)]m2



















= (w2 + θw3) [(γv + µ)S0 + σθ(γu + µ)V20]
=
w3 [(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + σθπ̄γ1(γu + µ)]
2
σπ̄γ1(γu + µ) [ωV γ1 + (π̄ + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ)]
> 0.
(4.14b)
According to [14], the local dynamics of the system (4.12) around the DFE
are totally determined by the signs of a and b (see Theorem 2.1). Since all the
parameter values as well as w3 as given in (4.11) are non-negative, the quan-
tity b in equation (4.14b) is always positive. On the other hand, the sign of
a depends on the sign of expressions in the curly bracket in (4.14a). If a > 0,
then there are unstable endemic equilibrium exhibiting backward bifurcation
near the DFE, while if a < 0, there are locally asymptotically stable endemic
equilibrium showing forward bifurcation near the DFE [84].
4.2.2 Analysis of the effective reproduction number
The interplay between the characteristics of imperfect vaccines in SIRVS epi-
demic model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity and the disease
outbreak threshold with vaccination as a control measure may be explained
by carrying out some analysis of Rvac (eq. (4.3)) for the following three cases.
Case 1: A model with only one class of vaccinated individuals
The SIRVS epidemic model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity as
given in (4.1) could be reduced to one class by assume either that the vacci-
nated individuals lost their high vaccine-induced immunity immediately (i.e.
γ1 → ∞ ⇔ 1γ1 → 0) or that the vaccine offers lifelong high vaccine-induced
immunity (i.e. γ1 → 0 ⇔ 1γ1 → ∞). The former (resp. the latter) corre-
sponding to the period of high vaccine-induced immunity is so short (resp.
long) that the V1 (resp. V2) class can be ignored.
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By firstly applying the L’Hopital’s rule to the expression Rvac in (4.3) and







(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
[
(γv + µ)(ωV + µ) + σθπ̄(γu + µ)






ωV + σπ̄ + µ




The limit of Rvac above corresponds to the effective reproduction number
of SIRVS with one class of vaccinated individuals with partially-protective
vaccine-induced immunity. The expression (4.15) is always less than basic re-
production number R0 = βγu+µ for 0 ≤ σ < 1. The smaller value of σ (i.e. the
better vaccine efficacy, 1−σ), the greater reduction to the basic reproduction
number.












which corresponds to the product of the basic reproduction number R0 and
µ
π̄+µ
. In this case, on average, a proportion µ
π̄+µ
of the contact made by a single
unvaccinated infective individual in the population would be with susceptible
[52]. Its value will be always less than R0 if the population vaccination rate
π̄ > 0. Notice that the expression (4.16) is independent of the parameters σ,
θ, γv and ωV .
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Case 2: A model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity.
(a) Totally failure vaccine (TFV) versus fully protective vaccine
(FPV)
When the vaccine is totally failure (i.e. σ = 1), the other two additional
vaccine characteristics, namely the reduced infectivity and faster recovery for
vaccinated infected individuals would become irrelevant. Therefore, we set









(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
[
(γv + µ)(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + θγ1π̄(γu + µ)






(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ) + γ1π̄




Unlike the one-class vaccinated individuals model whereby no reduction on
the reproduction number when σ = 1 (see expression in (4.15)), whenever
the population vaccination rate π̄ > 0, the expression in the curly bracket
in (4.17) will be always less than one due to appearance of π̄(ωV + µ) in its
denominator, where ωV +µ is the rate at which individuals leave the V2 class.
When the vaccine confers full protection (i.e. σ = 0) to vaccinated individ-
uals even though they only have low vaccine-induced immunity, the effective








(ωV + µ)(γ1 + µ)




When σ → 0, almost no vaccinated individuals in the V2 class would be in-
fected. Hence, the parameters θ and γv become irrelevant in determining the
value of effective reproduction number. By comparing expressions (4.17) and
(4.18), we found that RFPVvac < RTFVvac < R0, provided that γ1 does not ap-
proach 0, which implies that the reduction to basic reproduction number is
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larger whenever the vaccine offers full protection from infection risks to vacci-
nated individuals in the V2 class. Both expressions (4.17) and (4.18) are more
complicated than those (4.15) and (4.16) simply because they correspond to
the coexistence of vaccinated individuals with high and low vaccine-induced
immunity in the population.
(b) Lifelong and temporary low vaccine-induced immunity
If the duration of spending in the V2 class is very long for vaccinated individ-





(γu + µ)(γv + µ)
[
(γv + µ)µ(γ1 + µ) + σθγ1π̄(γu + µ)





















The first part of the expressions in (4.19) is exactly the one in (4.16) which
is the case whereby the duration of high vaccine-induced immunity is suffi-
ciently long. The second part could be interpreted as the expected number
of newly infected individuals produced by a vaccinated infected individual
when the reduced susceptibility for vaccinated individual is σ, multiply with
two factors, namely the proportion of contact made would be with vaccinated
individuals in the V2 class (i.e.
π̄
π̄+µ
) as well as the probability of losing high




If vaccinated individuals only have temporary low vaccine-induced immu-








π̄ + γ1 + µ
]
. (4.20)
Expression (4.20) differs from (4.16) by the appearance of parameter γ1. As
long as the population vaccination rate π̄ > 0, the vaccine would be able to
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reduce the basic reproduction number in the two-class vaccine-induced im-
munity model even though vaccinated individuals would only stay in the V2
class temporarily. Note that the parameters σ, θ and γv become irrelevant in
this case.
Case 3: The effective reproduction number for immediate vaccina-
tion
Among the parameters in the effective reproduction number (4.3), we are most
interested in the population vaccination rate, π̄. We assume that if everyone
in the population vaccinated (i.e. π̄ → ∞), the vaccination is able to reduce
Rvac below one, otherwise vaccination is useless in combating the disease [52].












σθβγ1 < (γv + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ). (4.22)
The inequality (4.22) gives the condition of the combination parameter values
{β, θ, σ, γ1, γv, ωV , µ} whereby the disease will be eradicated if everyone in the
population vaccinated immediately. By rearranging Rvac(π̄) < 1, we arrive at
π̄ >






(γv + µ)(ωV + γ1 + µ)− σθβγ1
. (4.23)
As the condition given in (4.22), the denominator of the right-hand side of
inequality (4.23) is always positive. Thus, the population vaccination rate π̄
is positive if and only if β
γu+µ
− 1 > 0, i.e. R0 > 1.
In general, the SIRVS model with two-class of vaccine-induced immunity
seems to behave consistent with the one-class imperfect vaccine model in
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which the better vaccine efficacy, the greater reduction to the basic reproduc-
tion number will be. Also, the population vaccination rate is positive if and
only if R0 > 1. However, with the two classes of vaccine-induced immunity,
expressions (4.16) and (4.20) suggest that the vaccine efficacy does not appear
to be significant in determining Rvac if a vaccine is able to provide long-term
high immunity (γ1 →∞) or vaccinated individuals only have temporary low
immunity (ωV →∞).
4.3 The vaccination population games
4.3.1 Population-scale and individual-scale dynamics
Population-scale epidemic dynamics
In order to keep the population size constant, we exclude the recruitment
rate, natural and disease-induced death rate in the extended model in [30],
that is by setting Λ = µ = 0 in model (4.1). Then, we have
dS
dt
= −λS − π̄S + ωRR + ωV V2,
dI
dt
= λS − γuI,
dW
dt
= σλV2 − γvW,
dR
dt
= γuI + γvW − ωRR,
dV1
dt
= π̄S − γ1V1,
dV2
dt
= γ1V1 − σλV2 − ωV V2.
(4.24)
In model (4.24), the population-level continuous vaccination rate is given by
π̄, where the bar denotes the average rate in the population. The model
(4.24) has three additional epidemiological aspects that have not previously
been described in Model (3.31) in [79]. First, apart from the two waning
rates of vaccine- and infection-acquired immunity, denoted by ωV and ωR,
respectively, in model (4.24) the vaccinated individuals with high vaccine-
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induced protection in the V1 class move to the V2 class with low vaccine-
induced protection at the rate γ1, which uses a gamma distribution for the
vaccine-derived immunity. This implies that there is always a mixed state
of vaccinators with full and partial protection from infection in model (4.24)
provided that γ1 does not approach ∞, whereas Model (3.31) in [79] could
either have all fully- or partially-protected vaccinators, not both, depending
on the pre-defined value of parameter σ. Second, the model (4.24) has two
recovery rates γu and γv where the latter does not appear in Model (3.31)
in [79]. Third, the model (4.24) has additional parameter θ which gives the
reduced transmissibility in breakthrough infection for individuals in the W
class. By incorporating the parameter θ in vaccination population games, the
scenario that only vaccinated individuals bear the cost of vaccination while
those who are not vaccinated benefit directly from the reduced transmissibil-
ity of vaccinated infected individuals can be explored. This shifts from the
individual self-interest towards selflessness in vaccination decisions. Hence,
the vaccination population game of model (4.24) provides an alternative to
study the influence of altruism in vaccination decisions, as altruism does play
an important role in vaccination decisions [91].
Similar to model (4.1), the model (4.24) has a disease-free equilibrium
(DFE) given by E0 = (S0, I0,W0, R0, V10, V20) = (S0, 0, 0, 0, V10, V20) where
S0 =
ωV γ1
ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1)π̄
, V10 =
ωV π̄
ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1)π̄
, V20 =
γ1π̄
ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1)π̄
(4.25)








γvωV γ1 + σθγ1π̄γu
ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1)π̄
]
. (4.26)
Let E∗ = (S∗, I∗, R∗,W ∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) represent any endemic equilibrium point





∗ + a0 = 0, (4.27)
where
a2 = σ(ωR + γu)γ1γv > 0, (4.28a)
a1 = σγu
[









γ1ωV + (ωV + γ1)π̄
]
(1−Rvac). (4.28c)
The model (4.24) has (i) a unique endemic equilibrium if a0 < 0, (ii) a unique
endemic equilibrium if a0 = 0 (⇔ Rvac = 1) or a21 − 4a2a0 = 0, and a1 < 0,
(iii) two endemic equilibria if a0 > 0, a1 < 0 and a
2
1 − 4a2a0 > 0, and (iv) no
endemic equilibrium otherwise.
Since all the parameters value are non-negative, the coefficient a2 is al-
ways positive. The coefficient a0 is positive (resp. negative) if Rvac is less
than (resp. greater than) 1. As in [108], the above cases can be deduced
with the help of Descartes rule of signs which states that if the terms of a
polynomial with real coefficients are arranged in descending order, then the
number of positive roots of the polynomial is either equal to the number of
sign changes between the non-zero coefficients or less than the sign changes
by a multiple of 2 (as the polynomial may have complex roots which always
come in pairs).
For case (i), whenever a2 > 0 and a0 < 0, no matter a1 > 0 or a1 < 0,
there is always only one change of sign between the consecutive coefficients.
Therefore, according to the Descartes rule of signs, there exists a unique en-
demic equilibrium if a0 < 0. For case (ii), when a0 = 0, the quadratic equation
(4.27) reduces to λ∗(a2λ
∗ + a1) = 0 and hence λ
∗ = 0 or λ∗ = −a1
a2
. Alter-
natively, when a21 − 4a2a0 = 0, solving equation (4.27) gives λ∗ = − a12a2 . For
both subcases, it follows that equation (4.27) has a unique positive endemic
equilibrium if a1 < 0. For case (iii), if a0 > 0 and a1 < 0, we have exactly two
77
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Backward bifurcation diagram for model (4.24) in the (λ∗,Rvac)
and (π̄, σ) plane.
changes of signs and according to the Descartes rule of signs, there is possible
two or no real positive root for the equation (4.27). Thus, the additional con-
dition of the discriminant a21 − 4a2a0 > 0 rules out the possibilities of having
a pair of complex roots and we deduce that the model (4.24) has two endemic
equilibria in this case.
The existence of two endemic equilibria in case (iii) suggests that the oc-
currence of backward bifurcation phenomenon in the SIRVS model with two
classes of vaccine-induced immunity is also a direct consequence of modelling
the imperfect vaccines [44]. Backward bifurcation phenomenon has important
public health implications because it might not be sufficient to reduce Rvac
below unity to eliminate the disease [10]. Depending on the initial sizes of the
infective, the disease would persist if Rvac is close to unity [30]. Figure 4.1
gives the simulation of model (4.24) for the combination of parameter values
(β, θ, γu, γv, γ1, ωR, ωV , π̄, σ) = (2, 0.85, 0.4, 2, 0.15, 0.5, 0.05, 0.25, 0.75) which
illustrates the phenomenon of backward bifurcation in the SIRVS model with
two classes of vaccine-induced immunity.
78
By setting the discriminant of equation (4.27) to zero (i.e. 4 = a21 −





where Θ = ωRγuγv [ωV γ1 + (ωV + γ1)π̄]. Figure 4.1(a) clearly shows that the
backward bifurcation occurs at value Rvac = 1 and a subsequent saddle-node
(or fold) bifurcation (two endemic equilibria collide and disappear) at Rcvac.
In the range of Rcvac < Rvac < 1, both stable endemic and disease-free equi-
librium coexist with an unstable endemic equilibrium. For the cases where
the phenomenon of backward bifurcation occurs, the effective reproduction
number must be reduced below Rcvac in order to ensure that the disease dies
out.
In the absence of vaccination, i.e. at π̄ = 0, Rvac reduces to basic repro-
duction number, R0 = βγu , and the quadratic equation (4.27) together with
(4.28) becomes
σ(ωR + γu)γ1γv(λ
∗)2 + {γ1γv [σωR(γu − β) + ωV (ωR + γu)]}λ∗
+ ωRγvγ1ωV (γu − β) = 0. (4.29)
Solving the quadratic equation (4.29) gives two solutions, λ∗10 = (β−γu) ωRωR+γu
and λ∗20 = −ωVσ < 0. Since λ
∗
20 is biologically infeasible, we conclude that the
force of infection corresponding to no vaccination in the population is given
by




Note that the vaccine-associated epidemiological (i.e. θ, γv) and immune (i.e.
γ1, ωV ) parameters do not appear in (4.30).
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In the case where individuals in the population vaccinate instantly, π̄ →
∞, by rearranging equation (4.27) and finding the limit of λ∗ when π̄ → ∞




[σθβγ1 − γv(γ1 + ωV )]ωR
σ [γ1(γv + ωR) + γvωR]
. (4.31)




[σθβγ1 − γv(γ1 + ωV )]ωR
σ [γ1(γv + ωR) + γvωR]
}
.
Note that this λ∗ is independent of the unvaccinated infected individuals’ re-
covery rate γu and the transmission rate becomes θβ in instant vaccination.
Also, the expression (4.31) is non-negative if and only if the reverse of the
inequality (4.22) is being satisfied. That is, if σθβγ1 > γv(γ1 + ωV ), even
the instant vaccination of everyone in the population will not eradicate the
infectious diseases.
Individual-scale dynamics
An individual-scale model can be expressed as a Markov process with transi-
tion rates derived from the population-scale model. Specifically, the changes
in a single representative individual’s disease state when the population dy-





with p(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]T . The initial condition p(0) means that ev-
ery individual in the population starts in the susceptible state. p(t) is the
probability density that an individual is susceptible, unvaccinated infected,
vaccinated infected, recovered, vaccinated with high vaccine-induced immu-
nity or vaccinated with low vaccine-induced immunity at time t, that is
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p(t) = [S(t), I(t),W (t), R(t), V1(t), V2(t)]
T . The full matrix form of equation
















−λ∗ − π 0 0 ωR 0 ωV
λ∗ −γu 0 0 0 0
0 0 −γv 0 0 σλ∗
0 γu γv −ωR 0 0
π 0 0 0 −γ1 0











Note that the individual vaccination rate, π is used in individual-scale dy-
namics. It could be the same or different from the population vaccination
rate, π̄.
4.3.2 Utility calculation
In this subsection, the expected utility function will be calculated according
to the Markov decision process theory. In population games, the utility of
any strategy depends on both the individual’s strategy and population (res-
ident) average strategy (i.e. choice, decision, behaviour, or investment). An
individual’s strategy may differ from the resident strategy. We assume that
almost all individuals in the population use the population average strategy,
and the population is so large that population epidemic dynamics are not
significantly affected by the change of a single individual’s strategy [92].
According to [79], the expected utility has the following closed form
U(a, ā) =
[
fT + 1T (F •Q∗)
]
(hI−Q∗)−1p(0), (4.34)
where a is an individual’s strategy and ā is its corresponding population av-
erage strategy, U(a, ā) indicates that the individual’s utility depends on both
the individual’s decision and the population’s average behaviour, h is the dis-
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count rate, I is identity matrix, f is the vector of utility (or payoff) gains
per unit time for individuals (or residents) of each state, F is the vector of












0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
−cV 0 0 0 0 0












As individuals reside in the unvaccinated infected (resp. vaccinated in-
fected) state, they accumulate the cost of infection, cI (resp. cW ). The
instantaneous vaccination cost cV to the individual occurs in the transition
from susceptible to vaccinated state in the V1 class. The vaccination cost cV
is referred to not only the monetary cost, but also the psychological bur-
den of possibility of developing vaccine side effects (VSE). F • Q∗ is the
Hadamard product, i.e. the product of the components of F and Q∗. Thus,
by using equations (4.35), the expected change in utility per unit time for
individuals in each disease state is given by the vector fT + 1T (F • Q∗) =
[−πcV − cI − cW 0 0 0 ]. Thus, by using equation (4.34) and taking
limh→0 hU(a, ā), the utility of strategy π to an individual in a population at
equilibrium with strategy π̄ is given by
U(π, π̄) =
−ωRγ1 {λ∗ [(λ∗σ + ωV )γvcI + πσγucW ] + γuγvπ(λ∗σ + ωV )cV }




u11 = γ1γv(γu + ωR)σ, (4.36b)
u12 = γ1γv [ωV (γu + ωR) + γuωRσ] + σπγu [ωR(γ1 + γv) + γ1γv] , (4.36c)
u13 = γuγvωR [γ1ωV + (γ1 + ωV )π] . (4.36d)
Since the epidemiological parameters are all non-negative, the utility cal-
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culated by equations (4.36) will be always less than 0 and hence termed as
disutility. For a given population vaccination rate π̄, individuals aim to min-
imize the loss of utility, i.e. maximize the disutility by choosing their own
individual vaccination rate π. For simplicity, we define the relative cost of vac-
cination to cost of infection as c = cV
cI
, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 and set ωR = ωV = ω,
cW = cI = 1 . The utility function U(π, π̄) in (4.36) is an expression of var-
ious costs (cI , cW and cV ), epidemiological parameters (γ1, γu, γv, ωR, ωV ),
the probability of vaccine failure (σ), individual vaccination rate (π), and the
population force of infection at steady state (λ∗), with the population-level
vaccination rate π̄ implicitly embedded in λ∗ through equations (4.27) and
(4.28). Since equation (4.27) is not linear as well as the mathematical rela-
tion between π̄ and λ∗ is not always one-to-one, it is not possible to replace
the terms λ∗ in utility function (4.36) explicitly by the population-level vac-
cination rate π̄ so as to investigate the individuals’ best response (of their
own vaccination rate π) on the population-level vaccination rate π̄. Hence,
for vaccination population games with imperfect vaccine, the individual best
response correspondence, πbest, is defined differently for specific subsets of c
in the following form:
πbest(c) =

0 if c > cno
[0,∞) if cinstant ≤ c ≤ cno
∞ if c < cinstant
, (4.37)
where cno and cinstant are the cost threshold for no vaccination and instant
vaccination, respectively. We will derive these two thresholds in the next sub-
section.
In order to find the rate of change in utility when the individual vaccination
rate π is varied, we differentiate the utility function (4.36) with respect to π,
equate the resulting derivative to zero and change the subject of formula to
c, we obtain the following critical value c.
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c =
λ∗ [σ2(λ∗)2c11 + σωλ
∗c12 + ω
2c13]
σ2(λ∗)3c21 + σω(λ∗)2c22 + ω2λ∗c23 + ω3c24
, (4.38)
where c11 = γv(γ1 + ω) − γ1γu, c12 = 2γv(ω + γ1) − (σ + 1)γ1γu, c13 =
γv(ω + γ1) − σγ1γu, c21 = γ1γv(γu + ω), c22 = γ1γv [γu(σ + 2) + 2ω],
c23 = γ1γv(ω+ 2σγu + γu) and c24 = γ1γuγv. Rearranging equation (4.38), we




∗ + A0 = 0, (4.39)
where
A3 = σ
2 [γ1γv(γu + ω)c+ γ1γu − γv(γ1 + ω)] , (4.40a)
A2 = σω {γ1γv [γu(σ + 2) + 2ω] c+ γ1γu(σ + 1)− 2γv(ω + γ1)} , (4.40b)
A1 = ω
2 {γ1γv(ω + 2σγu + γu)c+ σγ1γu − γv(ω + γ1)} , (4.40c)
A0 = ω
3γ1γuγvc > 0. (4.40d)
Equations (4.27) and (4.39) not only differ in the order of its polynomial
and the number of parameters involved, but also most importantly, the cubic
equation (4.39) is the result of investigating the interplay among the relative
cost of vaccination to infection c, the force of infection λ∗ and the population
vaccination rate, π̄, whereas equation (4.27) is only focusing on the relation
of the force of infection (λ∗) and the population vaccination rate (π̄).
4.3.3 Population game analysis
We assume that individuals are fully rational in making their vaccination de-
cision and have complete knowledge about the epidemiological parameters,
including the three additional parameters in the two-class vaccine-acquired
immunity model, namely the duration of staying in V1 class after vaccina-
tion, the recovery rate and the reduced transmissibility of vaccinated infected
individuals. As a direct consequence of splitting the vaccinated individuals
with full protection (V1) from those with partial protection (V2), we further
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assume that the first additional parameter (γ1) is the factor being considered
by rational individuals before they take into account the vaccine efficacy in
their decision making, as vaccine efficacy is only relevant to vaccinated indi-
viduals after they have lost their high vaccine-induced immunity and move to
the V2 class in a rate γ1. Meanwhile, the second (θ) and third (γv) additional
parameters are factors being considered after the vaccine efficacy. These two
factors play no role if the vaccine is very efficient (i.e. σ → 0, see eq. (4.18)).
These additional assumptions are not strong or not compulsory, either, but it
will be useful in explaining our numerical simulation results later.
The Nash equilibrium vaccination rate is denoted as π∗. By taking ωR =
ωV = ω, we first find the threshold of the relative cost of vaccination to
infection, c, for the zero population vaccination rate (i.e. π∗ = π̄ = 0) by
substituting equation (4.30) into equation (4.38). The resulting critical value
c is the cost threshold for no vaccination, cno. If
c > cno =
(β − γu) [(γ1 + ω)k1 − σγ1γu(β + ω)]
βγ1(γu + ω)k1
, (4.41)
where k1 = γv [(1− σ)γu + σβ + ω], then no one in the population will vac-
cinate. Similarly, by substituting equation (4.31) into equation (4.38), we
conclude that if σθβγ1 > γv(γ1 + ωV ) and
c < cinstant =
(γ1θσβ − k4γv) {θσβ(k4γv − γ1γu)− k3σγu + γvk4k5}
γ1γv {k5γ1(θσβ)2 + θσβ [k3σγu − k5k2)] + γuσωk3 − γvωk4k5}
,
(4.42)
where k2 = γv(γ1 + ω) − γ1ω, k3 = ω(γ1 + γv) + γvγ1, k4 = γ1 + ω and
k5 = γu + ω, then susceptible individuals in the population will vaccinate
instantly (i.e. π∗ = π̄ →∞). Whenever
cinstant ≤ c ≤ cno, (4.43)
the vaccination rate in the population is finite (i.e. π∗ = π̄ ∈ (0,∞)).
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Since every cubic equation with real coefficients has at least one solution
among the real numbers, we find the closed-form of the discriminant of the
cubic equation (4.39) with
4 = 18A3A2A1A0 − 4A32A0 + A22A21 − 4A3A31 − 27A23A20. (4.44)
If 4 = 0, then the cubic equation (4.39) has a multiple root and all its roots
are real. This corresponds to the case where saddle-node (or fold) bifurcation
occurs in the utility function (4.36), i.e. the multiple endemic equilibria λ∗
(and its corresponding population vaccination rates π̄, if exist) collide and
merge into one. After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain the following
quadratic equation for the location of saddle-node (or fold) bifurcation in
terms of the variable c.
k27
([
γ1γv [(σ − 1)γu − ω]
]2
c2




where k6 = γv(γ1+ω) and k7 = γ1γuσ(σ−1)ω3. Therefore, with other parame-
ters fixed, theoretically, bifurcation should occur at the roots of the quadratic
equation (4.45), that is the number of endemic equilibrium and hence the
Nash equilibria of vaccination rate should change from three to two, and then
to only one.
However, by investigating various possibilities for the roots of cubic equa-
tion (4.39) using the Descartes rule of signs (as in [123]), we find that the
necessary condition for the cubic equation (4.39) to have three positive real
roots is that whenever Case 7 in Table 4.1 is satisfied. Let us assume that the
equation (4.39) does have three positive real roots. It follows that the follow-
ing three inequalities must be satisfied at the same time for the combination
of parameter values selected in the numerical simulations.
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Table 4.1: Number of possible positive real roots of equation (4.39)
Case A3 A2 A1 A0 Number of Number of possible
sign changes positive real roots
1 + + + + 0 0
2 + + − + 2 2, 0
3 + − + + 2 2, 0
4 − + + + 1 1
5 + − − + 2 2, 0
6 − − + + 1 1
7 − + − + 3 3, 1
8 − − − + 1 1
γ1γv(γu + ω)c+ γ1γu < γv(ω + γ1), (4.46a)
1
2
{γ1γv [γu(σ + 2) + 2ω] c+ γ1γu(1 + σ)} > γv(ω + γ1), (4.46b)
γ1γv(ω + 2σγu + γu)c+ σγ1γu < γv(ω + γ1). (4.46c)
By using the transitivity of order in real number axioms (i.e. if A < B
and B < C, then A < C), the inequalities (4.46a) and (4.46b) give
2γ1γv(γu + ω) + 2γ1γu < 2γ1γv(γu + ω)c+ γ1γvγuσc+ γ1γu(1 + σ).
After simplifying, we obtain σ(γvc+1) > 1. Similarly, the inequalities (4.46b)
and (4.46c) give σ(3γvc + 1) < 1. By applying the transitivity of order
once more to these two resulting inequalities, we arrive at the inequality
σ(3γvc + 1) < σ(γvc + 1) which results in 3 < 1. This contradicts with
the basic properties of the real number. Hence, our earlier assumption that
the cubic equation (4.39) has three positive real roots is not valid. There-
fore, we rule out the possibility to have three positive real roots in the cubic
equation (4.39). It follows that the phenomenon of pitchfork bifurcation and
hysteresis loops are not possible for the cubic equation (4.39) meanwhile the
saddle-node (or fold) bifurcation are still possible if Cases 2, 3, and 5 in Table
4.1 are satisfied.
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(a) γu = γv = 1, γ1 = 10, ω = 0.05, β = 6,
θ = 1
(b) Same as (a) except γ1 = 0.9
(c) Same as (a) except γv = 1.1 (d) Same as (a) except θ = 0.8
Figure 4.2: Parameter-space (c-σ) diagram of the bifurcation structure in the
Nash equalibria of equation (4.36).
4.4 Results and discussion
4.4.1 The cost thresholds for no, finite and instant vac-
cination for three additional characteristics of im-
perfect vaccine
In the previous section, we derived the cost threshold for no vaccination (eq.
(4.41)) and instant vaccination (eq. (4.42)), as well as the condition for the
location of fold bifurcation (eq. (4.45)) in the utility function (eq. (4.36)). In
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the aspect of epidemiological parameters, the impact of the additional three
characteristics of imperfect vaccine, namely γ1, θ and γv in our proposed
model, on the individual vaccination decision-making has not previously been
described in the model (3.31) in [79]. However, if we assume that all vacci-
nated individuals in the V1 class move to the V2 class instantly (i.e. γ1 →∞,
say γ1 = 10), and vaccinated infected individuals in the W class have the
same infectiousness (i.e. θ = 1) and recovery rate (i.e. γv = γu) as those
unvaccinated infected individuals in the I class, our proposed model (and
its corresponds cost thresholds and condition for the location of fold bifur-
cation) reduces to the model (3.31) in [79]. We recover the same pattern of
parameter-space (c-σ) diagram of the bifurcation structure in the Nash equi-
libria, as depicted in Figure 4.2(a).
We then carried out some sensitivity analysis of the cost thresholds in
order to have a rough idea on how each additional epidemiological parameter
of imperfect vaccine influences the Nash equilibrium vaccination strategy in
population game. If a small portion of vaccinated individuals stays in the
V1 class for some duration of time (i.e. γ1 < 1), or vaccinated infected indi-
viduals recover slightly faster than the unvaccinated infected individuals (for
instance, γv = 1.1 > γu = 1), then all three curves are shifted upward for
σ → 1 (Figures 4.2(b) and 4.2(c)). These two parameters tuning will also
cause a marginally shift to the right for the instant vaccination boundary, as
the lower bound of σ for instant vaccination boundary could be determined
through solving inequality σθβγ1 > γv(γ1 + ωV ). When vaccinated infected
individuals have a slightly reduced transmissibility (e.g. θ = 0.8), we observe
that the curve for the instant vaccination boundary is shifted to the right on a
larger scale (Figure 4.2(d)) compared to the cases of γ1 and γv. These suggest
that incorporating additional characteristics of imperfect vaccine may alter
the individual best response for vaccination strategy.
To further investigate the impact of additional characteristics of imperfect
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(a) θ = 0.85
(b) θ = 0.65
Figure 4.3: The cost thresholds for no and instant vaccination with various
values of γ1 and θ.
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vaccine on vaccination behaviours, we plot the cost thresholds for no vac-
cination and instant vaccination for various values of γ1 = {0.15, 0.35, 2.5}
and θ = {0.85, 0.65} in Figure 4.3. For both diagrams, the parameter values
(β, γu, γv, ω) = (6, 1, 2, 0.05) are used.
As defined in equation (4.37), with the pairs of cost threshold for no and
instant vaccination, the c-σ plane in Figure 4.3 could be divided into three
regions, namely no vaccination, finite vaccination and instant vaccination. If
both the c and σ values fall into the region of no (resp. instant) vaccination,
no one (resp. everyone) in the population will opt for vaccination. However,
as the equilibrium of force of infection λ∗ at π̄ → ∞ in equation (4.31) will
be positive if and only if σθβγ1 > γv(γ1 + ω) (where ω ≡ ωV ), the region of
instant vaccination should be viewed as unfavourable from the perspective of
infectious diseases control. This is because the region of instant vaccination
is referred to as the scenario in which even though everyone in the population
vaccinated immediately, the infectious diseases would still not be eradicated.
Hence, the vaccine efficacy (1 − σ) could be a major factor, if not the only
one, causing the voluntary vaccination program not sufficient in reducing the
basic reproduction number to below unity.
The relationship between relative cost of vaccination and vaccine efficacy
for no vaccination is much more simple in which the cost threshold of no
vaccination (eq. (4.41)) is a decreasing function of σ. For a specific vaccine
efficacy, 1− σ, the longer duration the vaccinated individuals reside in the V1
class (i.e. smaller γ1), the higher the cost threshold for no vaccination (three
upper curves in Figure 4.3(a)) will be. From the community perspective, the
higher the cost threshold for no vaccination, the better it will be since indi-
viduals will not opt for vaccination if the relative cost of vaccination, c, is
higher than the cost threshold of no vaccination. From an individual point of
view, higher cost threshold for no vaccination implies that his/her utility is
lower if he/she refuses to vaccinate, and hence rational individuals are highly
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likely to vaccinate if γ1 is small. As the higher values of σ correspond to the
lower vaccine efficacy, and vice versa, when the transition rate from V1 to V2
class is low enough (for instance γ1 = 0.15) and the vaccine efficacy is high
enough (i.e. σ → 0), the Nash equilibrium vaccination rate is always finite.
The effect of γ1 on the instant vaccination boundary, albeit minimal, is not
insignificant. As observed in Figure 4.2(b), any γ1 value less than 1 will shift
the three curves upward for σ → 1. Therefore, in Figure 4.3(a) with θ = 0.85,
we found that the instant vaccination will only occur when σ > 0.4. For
intermediate values of σ, the longer duration individuals stay in the V1 class,
the lower the relative cost will be for instant vaccination to occur. However,
it is interesting to find that as σ → 1, instant vaccination occurs for higher
relative cost of vaccination when γ1 is smaller. A possible explanation for this
might be that the model (4.24) takes into account more realistic assumptions
that the vaccine would offer, on one hand full protection to individuals in V1
and on the other hand, partial protection to individuals in V2. That is, a
mixed vaccinated individuals with full and partial protection coexist in the
population in the two-class vaccinated individuals model, while the one-class
imperfect vaccine-induced immunity model in [79] assumes that vaccine of-
fers either full protection or partial protection to all vaccinated individuals,
depending on the pre-defined σ value. Thus, when the vaccine failure is al-
most certain, the model (3.31) in [79] predicts no one in the population will
go for vaccination. It is therefore likely that the coexistence of vaccinated
individuals with full and partial protection may have something to do with
the dissimilarity between our vaccination population games in Figure 4.3(a)
and the one in Figure 5(a) in [79].
The effect of the reduction of transmissibility (or infectivity), θ in break-
through infection for individuals in the W class in relation to those in the I
class on individuals vaccination strategy is illustrated in Figure 4.3(b). As θ
only appears in the cost threshold for instant vaccination (4.42) but not in
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the cost threshold for no vaccination (4.41), the three upper curves in Figure
4.3(b) are exactly those in Figure 4.3(a). When the reduction of transmissibil-
ity increases (i.e. smaller θ, for instance θ = 0.65) and vaccinated individuals
stay longer in the V1 class (i.e. smaller γ1), the unfavourable phenomenon
of coexistence of instant vaccination and prevailing diseases occurs for lower
relative cost of vaccination and narrower range of low vaccine efficacy (Figure
4.3(b)).
When vaccine may offer large reduction of infectivity to vaccinated in-
fected individuals, vaccines can be of greater benefit to the society than to
the recipient who bears the cost of vaccination. It follows that vaccination
can be regarded as a somewhat altruistic behaviour [95]. If most people are
altruistic, the spontaneous vaccination rate will not differ substantially from
the social optimum [101]. Contrary to the selfishness assumption in the game
theory, it can thus be suggested that altruism reduces the possibility of in-
stant vaccination to occur but diseases may not be eradicated in our two-class
vaccine-induced immunity epidemic model with additional reduction trans-
missibility parameter θ, despite the fact that vaccine is not fully perfect.
As Figure 4.2(c) reveals that for any γv value greater than γu, the cost
thresholds for no vaccination and for instant vaccination will be shifted up-
ward. We further examine the effect of γv on the vaccination rates in the two
classes of vaccine-induced immunity model, in Figure 4.4. The most obvious
finding to emerge from this figure is that when the γv value increases, the cost
threshold for no vaccination are shifted upward, on a greater scale, especially
for larger value of σ. When vaccine is very effective in protecting vaccinated
individuals with low vaccine-induced immunity from getting infection, it is
likely that individuals will only put slightest concern on the recovery rate
for breakthrough infection in making their vaccination decisions. However, if
vaccine is not effective in reducing vaccinated individuals’ susceptibility, then
the fact that vaccine is able to shorten the duration of infection will signifi-
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Figure 4.4: The cost thresholds for no and instant vaccination with various
values of γv.
cantly raise the cost threshold for no vaccination. That is, individuals will not
refuse to vaccinate for a higher relative cost of vaccination (i.e. lower utility)
if vaccines offer faster recovery in breakthrough infection. On the other hand,
the faster vaccineted infected individuals recovered, the unfavourable instant
vaccination occurs for lower c and larger σ.
It is interesting to note that in all cases of Figures 4.3 and 4.4, when the
probability of vaccine failure is low, i.e. σ → 0, no one takes vaccination
instantly. However, expression (4.15) implies that the better vaccine effi-
cacy, the greater reduction to basic reproduction number will be and hence
epidemic could be better controlled. Thus, with the population vaccination
games framework, we are able to demonstrate that individuals would not
refuse to vaccinate in all range of relative cost of vaccination to infection (i.e.
finite vaccination rate always exists) when σ → 0 provided that vaccinated
individuals do not lose their high vaccine-induced immunity in a short time.
These results further support the claim in [113] that although an increase in
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vaccination effectiveness leads to vaccine uptake drops due to free-riding ef-
fects, the epidemic can be better mitigated. It could be argued that the drop
of vaccine uptake in [113] might be attributed to no instant vaccination from
self-interested individuals, meanwhile a possible explanation for better mitiga-
tion of epidemic despite of vaccine uptake drops might be that of the existence
of finite vaccination rate in all range of relative vaccination costs when σ → 0.
4.4.2 Nash equilibrium vaccination rate
We solve the cubic equation (4.39) together with (4.40) numerically for pa-
rameter values (β, θ, γ1, γu, γv, ω) = (6, 0.85, 0.15, 1, 2, 0.05) for σ = 0.15 and
plot the graph of the equilibrium force of infection λ∗ versus the relative cost
of vaccination c in Figure 4.5(a). As agreed with the findings in inequali-
ties (4.46), the graph gives at most two endemic equilibria. Furthermore,
equation (4.45) and the numerical simulation in Figure 4.5(a) both give the
location of fold bifurcation at c = 0.874. By substituting the force of infec-
tion λ∗ obtained into the quadratic equation (4.27) with (4.28), and solving
for population vaccination rate π̄, the Nash equilibrium vaccination rate (i.e.
π∗ = π̄ = π) versus the relative cost of vaccination c is depicted in Figure
4.5(b). The existence of an equilibrium in the population games is referred
to as a stable collection of individual strategies such that nobody has any
incentive to change his own individual strategy [87]. We find that there is
neither instant vaccination nor multiple Nash equilibria vaccination rates, for
this specific combination of parameter values in vaccination population game
with two-class vaccine-induced immunity. As the combination of parameter
values used in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) are the same as the parameter values
for the solid line curves in Figure 4.3(a), when σ = 0.15, the cost threshold
for no vaccination is c ≈ 0.858 (see Figure 4.3(a)). Thus, the curve of popula-
tion equilibrium vaccination rate in Figure 4.5(b) is in good agreement with
that of Figure 4.3(a). This implies that the two cost thresholds derived in
Subsection 4.3.3 may be used to study the interplay among the relative cost
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(a) σ = 0.15 (b) σ = 0.15
(c) σ = 0.8 (d) σ = 0.8
Figure 4.5: Dependence of the force of infection λ∗ and equilibrium vaccina-
tion rate π∗ on the relative cost of vaccination c, for β = 6.
of vaccination to infection, c, the force of infection λ∗ at steady state and
the population vaccination rate π̄, without having to solve the cubic equation
(4.39) and the quadratic equation (4.27).
We then plot the graph of equilibrium force of infection λ∗ (and its Nash
equilibrium vaccination rate π∗) versus the relative cost of vaccination c for
the same combination of parameter values except σ = 0.8. As can be seen on
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Dependence of the force of infection λ∗ and equilibrium vacci-
nation rate π∗ = π̄ on the relative cost of vaccination c, for β = 18 and
θ = {0.85, 0.65, 0.15}.
the lower solid-line curve in Figure 4.3(a), instant vaccination occurs when
c < 0.429. The same behaviour is observed in Figure 4.5(d) whereby the
Nash equilibrium vaccination rates are greater than 1 for c < 0.429. If we
calculate the corresponding force of infection λ∗ (Figure 4.5(c)) (unlike Figure
4.5(a), we discard those λ∗ > λ∗(π∗ = 0) = 0.238 in this graph), we find that
the force of infection is not zero even though individuals vaccinate instantly
when c < 0.429. These results further support that the instant vaccination in
the vaccination population game is not favourable from perspective of the in-
fectious diseases control, simply because diseases will not be eradicated even
though π∗ is already high. Also, it seems possible that these unfavourable
instant vaccinations are due to imperfect vaccines.
We then increase the disease transmission rate from β = 6 to β = 18 to in-
vestigate the individuals vaccination decision-making in the course of a highly
contagious infectious disease, with (β, σ, γ1, γu, γv, ω) = (18, 0.15, 0.15, 1, 2, 0.05)
for θ = {0.85, 0.65, 0.15}. As the force of infection λ∗(π̄ = 0) = 0.810, we dis-
card the graph whenever the numerical simulation gives λ∗ > 0.810 in Figure
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4.6(a). Similar to Figure 4.5(a), the force of infection λ∗ at steady state in
Figure 4.6(a) shows the occurrence of the fold bifurcation at a specific value
of cfold ≈ 0.917. When the c value is greater than cfold there is no feasi-
ble endemic equilibrium but when the c value is smaller than and close to
cfold, there are two endemic equilibria. The phenomenon of fold bifurcation
complicates the individual vaccination decision-making in the cases of highly
contagious infectious disease in which the three Nash equilibria vaccination
rates π∗ = π̄ = π, corresponding to two finite vaccination rates and one no
vaccination which coexist at 0.861 ≤ c ≤ 0.874 (Figure 4.6(b)).
As θ is implicitly appear in λ∗ = β I
∗+θW ∗
N∗
, the curves in Figure 4.6(b)
clearly shows that the greater reduction of infectivity to vaccinated infected
individuals (i.e. smaller θ) would be able to reduce the possibility of the
unfavourable phenomenon of instant vaccination coexistence with prevalent
infectious diseases in the population. For instance, even though its corre-
sponding λ∗ are non-zero whenever c < 0.861 for all three θ values, finite
vaccination (i.e. π∗ < 1) is the Nash equilibrium strategy for θ = 0.15 as
compared to instant vaccination (i.e. π∗ > 1) for θ = 0.65 and 0.85.
4.5 Concluding remarks
We conclude this chapter with the following remarks.
(i) Rational individuals would not refuse to vaccinate if vaccines are able to
provide longer duration of high vaccine-induced immunity to vaccinated
individuals.
(ii) All individuals opt for vaccination instantly for an intermediate region
of vaccine efficacy when vaccines neither offer much shorter duration of
recovery nor greater reduction of transmissibility for vaccinated infected
individuals in breakthrough infection.
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(iii) Greater reduction of infectivity to vaccinated infected individuals would
be able to reduce the possibility of the unfavourable phenomenon of in-
stant vaccination coexistence with prevalent infectious diseases in the
population whenever the vaccine is not effective in reducing vaccinated
individuals’ susceptibility.
(iv) When vaccine efficacy is low and vaccine does not offer faster recovery
to vaccinated infected individuals, self-interested individuals are highly
likely to refuse vaccination. However, the cost threshold for no vaccina-
tion is not affected by the scale of reduction of transmissibility offered by







The effectiveness of health preventive strategy against infectious diseases is
highly dependent on human self-initiated behaviour. The study of individual-
level decision-making on adopting health protective actions becomes espe-
cially relevant considering that certain control measures are not mandatory.
As vaccine-preventable diseases still pose a great threat to human popula-
tion, it is of great important to have a better understanding on the individual
voluntary vaccination decision-making. Individuals usually base their vacci-
nation choices on a complex balance of perceived costs of vaccination and
infection, which may be made through a simple cost-benefit analysis. The
perceived cost of vaccination is highly influenced by the perceived probability
of the vaccine complications, for instance, the vaccine adverse effects and the
degree of protection conferred by vaccines. Also, the perceived cost of infec-
tion is closely related to the severity of the epidemic outbreak.
In the last decade, there is a growing number of literatures on incorporat-
ing the individual vaccination decision-making based on cost-benefit analysis
into the epidemic models. In the language of game theory, the most simplest
type of the vaccination behavioural rule is that all susceptibles (i.e. players
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of the game) are assumed to have two strategies to choose, namely vacci-
nation and non-vaccination strategies. By opting for vaccination strategy,
it is assumed that individuals will go to vaccinate and the vaccine-induced
immunity becomes effective immediately, whereas adopting non-vaccination
strategy implies that individuals are subject to the risk of infection but they
will have the chance to make a new vaccination decision in the future. This
leads to an epidemic model with time-varying vaccination rate.
The classical game theory assumes that all players make their pure ratio-
nal decisions based on the complete and accurate information to maximize
their payoffs. Assuming other individuals’ strategy is given, the strategy
that produces the highest payoff for an individual is the best response for
him/her. For two-strategy games, the step-wise function such as the Heavi-
side step function may be used to describe the best response correspondence.
As for voluntary vaccination decision-making through cost-benefit consider-
ations, when the benefit is perceived to be higher (resp. lower) than the
perceived cost of vaccination, individuals will choose (resp. not choose) vac-
cination strategy. However, when the cost equals the benefit, the probability
of vaccination lies in [0, 1], which is indeed random. Hence, the best response
correspondence could be very sensitive to the epidemiology information used
in cost-benefit analysis.
The use of the best response correspondence in investigating vaccination
behavioural rule in epidemic models with well-mixed population could be
found in a type of vaccination population game framework whereby the util-
ity depends on both the individual’s vaccination decision and the population’s
average vaccination rate [79, 92]. Also, it was used in structured population
(i.e. network-based models) through agent-based simulation framework in
[18, 72].
However, in epidemiology, precise knowledge of the cost and the benefit of
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adopting a particular preventive strategy in the course of epidemic outbreak
is not explicitly available. Hence, evolutionary game theory which assumes
individuals are not fully rational is being considered in modelling voluntary
vaccination decisions. In this bounded rationality paradigm, individuals are
allowed to switch their strategy through imitating other’s strategy which gives
higher payoff (i.e. social learning). Through the use of a replicator dynamical
equation and rescaling of the cost of infection to vaccination, the step-wise
best response correspondence for cost-benefit analysis in [2, 25, 70] produces
the logistic-like of vaccine coverage dynamics. It can thus be suggested that
instead of non-smoothed best response correspondence, the smoothed ver-
sion of best response behaviour may be expressed in the form of the sigmoid
function. The mathematical functions with “S” shape including the logistic
function, hyperbolic tangent function and Gompertz function, which are all
differentiatable real functions.
Apart from using replicator equations to model the imitation process, in
bounded rationality paradigm, individuals are also allowed to make mistakes
by adopting a strategy which gives lower payoff. This smoothed best response
version of imitation dynamics in vaccination behaviour was first studied by
Fu and co-authors [35]. They used a type of logistic function known as Fermi
updating learning rule to model the strategy switching of players through
pairwise payoff comparisons. That is, an individual randomly chooses one
other individual in the population as his/her role model to play the game. In
their study, vaccine is assumed to be fully perfect and individuals use anec-
dotal evidence to estimate the cost and benefit of vaccination before making
decision in the beginning of an epidemic season. If the strength of selection
parameter in Fermi function (see parameter r in equation (5.6b)) is small, the
individual with a higher payoff may adopt the strategy of a less successful role
model. This characterization diverges from a fully rational decision in best
response dynamics models to a bounded rationality decision.
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Since then, this type of bounded rationality models has been extensively
explored in various aspects of vaccination decision making for epidemic mod-
els in structured population, and is mainly implemented through agent-based
simulation modelling framework. For instance, the vaccine with imperfect
immunity [13, 113], the provision of subsidy to vaccination [120, 121], and the
existence of committed vaccinators [58] were added to the framework in [35]
to investigate the impact of these factors on vaccination decision making and
hence the dynamics of vaccine coverage. The Fermi updating rule has been
modified by including social preference [122], conformity [45], memory [118],
average opinion from neighbours [11] or society [37] as the additional factors
in determining how the cost and benefit of vaccination are being perceived.
However, among these literatures, only few works [35, 58, 113, 120] give the
analytical frameworks apart from the agent-based simulations.
The two trends for modelling vaccination behaviour in literature, namely
the best response with Heaviside step function (mainly implemented through
mean-field epidemic model) and the smoothed best response with Fermi func-
tion (mainly implemented through agent-based simulations), suggest that the
smoothed best response could possibly be incorporated into mean-field epi-
demic models to study the similarity or the gap between full and bounded
rationality vaccination decision assumptions through theoretical analysis. To
this end, Xu and Cressman [116] studied the voluntary adult vaccination
decision-making by constructing a mean-field epidemic model coupled with
a cost-benefit analysis. The vaccination strategy adoption is governed by a
logistic function. This is indeed the mean-field version of the Fermi updating
function in the literature of vaccination behaviour.
Following the work in [116], in this chapter, we study the smoothed best
response dynamics of vaccination behaviour with another type of sigmoid
function known as Gompertz function. We formulate this Gompertz-type
smoothed best response for individuals vaccination decision based on a sim-
103
ple cost-benefit analysis in the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Vaccinated
(SIRV) epidemic model with partial vaccine-induced immunity in Section 5.2.
The dynamical behaviours of the system for both perfect vaccine and im-
perfect vaccine models are given in Section 5.3. Results and discussions are
presented in Section 5.4 followed by some concluding remarks in Section 5.5.
5.2 Model formulations
We begin by considering a simple Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Vaccinated
(SIRV) compartmental model with imperfect vaccine-induced immunity.
dS
dt
= Λ− β I
N









V − γI − µI, (5.1b)
dR
dt
= γI − µR, (5.1c)
dV
dt
= φ [G(4P )]S − σβ I
N
V − µV, (5.1d)
where N = S+ I +R+V , Λ is the (constant) recruitment rate of susceptible
corresponding to births and immigrations, µ is the constant natural death
rate of the population, β is the disease transmission rate, γ is the recovery
rate, σ ∈ [0, 1) is the probability of vaccine failure while 1 − σ gives the
vaccine efficacy and φ is the vaccination effort parameter [66]. G(4P ) is
the Gompertz-type smoothed best response function and φG(4P ) gives the
time-varying vaccination rate. 4P is the difference between payoff for adopt-
ing vaccination (PV ) and non-vaccination (PNV ) strategies.
We assume that every susceptible merely uses a simple cost-benefit analy-
sis in making decision whether or not to vaccinate in the course of an epidemic
outbreak. That is, susceptible individuals do not involve in any social learning
process in choosing their vaccination strategy. Since individuals are subjected
to the risk of getting infection if they are not vaccinated, the perceived payoff
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G(∆P), r = 5
G(∆P), r = 0.5
L(∆P), r = 5
L(∆P), r = 0.5
(a) s = 1, d = −ln(0.5)

























G(∆P), s = 1, d = −ln(0.5)
G(∆P), s = 0.8, d = −ln(0.625)
G(∆P), s = 1, d = −ln(0.2)
(b) r = 1
Figure 5.1: Graphs of best response correspondence, smoothed best response
with Gompertz function and logistic function.
for adopting non-vaccination strategy could be described as PNV = −β IN ,
where we simply assume that the cost of non-vaccination is proportional to
the disease transmission rate and depends on the state of the epidemic (i.e.
the disease prevalence). When vaccination is voluntary, taking vaccination
incurs not only monetary cost (e.g. time and money spent in getting vaccina-
tion) but also psychological cost (e.g. the risk of developing vaccine adverse
effects (VAE)). We denote these costs of vaccination as cv. When vaccine is
not fully perfect, being vaccinated does not guarantee an individual free from
infection risk. Individuals who opt for vaccination strategy would have to pay
an extra cost if breakthrough infection occurred. Hence, the perceived payoff
for vaccination strategy is defined as PV = −cv − σβ IN . This implies that PV
is lower if the vaccine is less effective. Therefore, the payoff difference is given
by
4P = PV − PNV
= (1− σ)β I
N
− cv. (5.2)
If PV > PNV , then individuals are highly likely to vaccinate.
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Unlike the full rationality models that use a Heaviside step function (5.3)
to construct the best response correspondence
BR(4P ) =

0 if 4P < 0
[0, 1] if 4P = 0
1 if 4P > 0,
(5.3)
a type of sigmoid function, known as Gompertz function, is implemented as
our smoothed best response function, i.e.,
G(4P ) = s e−d e−r4P , (5.4)
where s is the upper horizontal asymptote of the Gompertz function, d is the
displacement along typical x-axis (i.e. 4P -axis) and r gives the growth rate
of the Gompertz curve. We only consider s ∈ (0, 1], d > 0 and r > 0. Similar
to the logistic function used in [116], G(4P ) is defined as the probability of
susceptible taking the vaccination based on the cost-benefit considerations.
However, unlike the best response correspondence BR(4P ) whereby individ-
uals refuse to vaccinate once the cost is higher than the benefit, in smoothed
best response, even if the cost of vaccination is higher than the benefit of
getting vaccination, individuals will still opt for vaccination with probability
in between [0, 1
2
). This leads to the bounded rationality assumptions in evo-
lutionary game theory. On the other hand, individuals in best response will
vaccinate with probability one once the benefit is higher than the cost. As
for smoothed best response, this probability lies in (1
2
, 1].
Since we propose the use of the Gompertz function for quantifying the
probability of individual receiving vaccination, we set s = 1 so as to have
G(4P ) ∈ [0, 1]. However, we could simply assign the value of s less than
unity if we were to model the existence of a proportion of population who
refuse to take vaccination possibly for religious or psychological reasons. To
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be consistent with the Fermi function and logistic function used in litera-
ture, we further assume d = −ln(d0) so as to have d = 0.693 when we set
d0 = 0.5 (Figure 5.1(a)). By setting d0 = 0.5, it means that an individual
has 50-50 chance to adopt vaccination strategy when the payoff difference
4P = 0. Indeed, we may take other values of d0, for instance, d0 = 0.2, then
d = −ln(0.2) = 1.609 (i.e. a probability of 20% to vaccinate when 4P = 0
provided that s = 1, see Figure 5.1(b)) to reflect a scenario whereby indi-
viduals are more reluctant to vaccinate whenever they perceive that the cost
equals the benefit of vaccination. For the individuals responsiveness, r, to
the payoff difference, individuals are more sensitive to the payoff difference
when r is large. Similar to the logistic function, the Gompertz function ap-
proaches the best response correspondence (5.3) as r →∞ (see Figure 5.1(a)).
Substituting (5.2) into (5.4), we have
G(4P ) = s e−d e
−r((1−σ)β IN −cv)
. (5.5)
The φG (i.e. G(4P ) together with the vaccination effort parameter φ) gives
the non-constant vaccination rate for the population. At individual level, this
vaccination effort may also represent the proportion of susceptible individuals
who make their vaccination decision per unit time, as defined in [116]. By
assuming that disease prevalence is covered in media reports [66], in a way,
system (5.1) provides a simple framework to study the prevalence-based vac-
cination behavioural change.
For comparison purposes, in the following, the simple logistic function
L(4P ) used in mean-field model [116], and its counterpart Fermi function
F (4P ) used in agent-based simulation framework (e.g. [35]) are given.








where Pi and Pj are the payoffs for focal individual i and his/her role model
(say, individual j), respectively, in a pairwise payoff comparison. In both
equations (5.6), there are only one parameter value r for tuning. In contrast,
there are three tunable parameters, namely s, d and r to be chosen to reflect
the vaccination behaviour based on the Gompertz-type smoothed best re-
sponse function. This allows us to model various types of scenarios, as stated
in the aforementioned paragraph. Apart from that, the simple logistic curve
(5.6) will approach both its upper and lower horizontal asymptotes symmet-
rically, whereas the Gompertz function will approach the upper horizontal
asymptote much more gradually than the lower horizontal asymptote (Figure
5.1(a)). It can therefore be assumed that individuals require more motiva-
tion, in the form of greater payoff gain, to switch to vaccination strategy in
the Gompertz smoothed best response. Meanwhile, they will refuse to vacci-
nate even with the slightest decline of payoff when the net payoff is negative
(i.e. PNV > PV ). This asymmetric nature of Gompertz function corroborates
the ideas of asymmetric smoothed best response in [117], i.e. the risk-averse
individuals are more sensitive to the payoff difference when the net payoff is
negative.
5.3 Dynamical behaviour of the system
Since N(t) = S(t)+I(t)+R(t)+V (t), the rate of change of the population in
system (5.1) is given by dN
dt
= Λ−µN . At t→∞, we have N → Λ
µ
. Assuming
that Λ = µ, the population size is constant.
5.3.1 SIRV model with perfect vaccine


















S − γI − µI, (5.7b)
dR
dt








S − µV. (5.7d)
The disease free equilibrium (DFE) of system (5.7) is E0 = (S0, I0, R0, V0)
where I0 = R0 = 0 and
S0 =
µ








φ [s e−d er cv ] + µ
. (5.8b)
With the presence of voluntary vaccination as a control measure, the control
reproduction number is given by





φ [s e−d er cv ] + µ
)
, (5.9)
where R0 = βγ+µ is the basic reproduction number, which is a measure of
disease outbreak severity in the absence of vaccination.
Theorem 5.1. The disease free equilibrium of system (5.7) is locally asymp-
totically stable if RC < 1 and unstable if RC > 1.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of system (5.7) at DFE E0 is
J(E0) =

−φ g0 − µ − (1 + rd er cv φ g0) β S0 0 0
0 β S0 − γ − µ 0 0
0 γ −µ 0
φ g0 rd e
r cv φ g0 β S0 0 −µ
 , (5.10)
where g0 = s e
−d er cv > 0. The eigenvalues of the matrix J(E0) are given by
λ1 = λ2 = −µ, λ3 = −φ g0−µ and λ4 = βS0−γ−µ. If RC < 1, then λ4 < 0,
and all the eigenvalues of J(E0) are negative and E0 is locally asymptotically
stable.
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The endemic equilibrium E∗ = (S∗, I∗, R∗, V ∗) is obtained by first setting
the right-hand side of last three equations in (5.7) to zero. Since I∗ 6= 0, we
get S∗ = (γ+µ)N
∗
β














Use S∗+ I∗+R∗+ V ∗ = N∗, and without loss of generality, let N∗ = 1, then














∗) = 1− γ + µ
β





∗) leads to a transcendental-algebraic equation which
cannot be solved analytically for I∗. Following the work in [56, 85], we show
the existence of the endemic equilibrium through analytical study. Finding
the derivatives of h1(I
∗) and h2(I













∗) = −γ + µ
µ
< 0. (5.12b)
Since all the parameter values are non-negative, then from (5.12), h1(I
∗) is
a monotonic increasing function and h2(I
∗) is a linear decreasing function.












> 0 provided that R0 > 1. It is easy to know that
h1(0) < h2(0) if and only if RC > 1. Also, as the second order derivative of
h1(I










where g1 = s e
−d e−r(β I
∗−cv)
> 0 and g2 = g1rd β e
−r(β I∗−cv) > 0. h1(I
∗) is ei-
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Figure 5.2: Illustrations of h1(I
∗) (thin curves) and h2(I
∗) (thick line) for
showing the existence and uniqueness of I∗.
ther concave up (whenever d > er(βI
∗−cv), see lower curve C2) or concave down
(whenever d < er(βI
∗−cv), see upper curve C1) (as sketched in Figure 5.2). In
either way, we have one and only one point of intersection between the curve
h1(I
∗) and the line h2(I
∗) for 0 < I∗ < 1. That is, I∗ is unique if RC > 1
(and so as the endemic equilibrium E∗ exists and is unique). And, there exists
no point of intersection if RC < 1 which implies that h1(0) > h2(0). Also,
h2(I
∗) = 0 at I∗ = µ[β−(γ+µ)]
β(γ+µ)
implies that 0 < I∗ < 1 when R0 > 1.
Therefore, we conclude that system (5.7) has an unique endemic equilib-
rium E∗. We show that this endemic equilibrium is stable if RC > 1, in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.2: The endemic equilibrium of system (5.7) is locally asymptot-
ically stable if RC > 1 and unstable if RC < 1.




−β I∗ − φ g1 − µ −β S∗ − φ g2 S∗ 0 0
β I∗ β S∗ − γ − µ 0 0
0 γ −µ 0
φ g1 φ g2 S
∗ 0 −µ
 , (5.13)




det(J(E∗)) = I∗(γ + µ) (φ g2 + β) > 0,
tr(J(E∗)) = −βI∗ − φ g1 − µ < 0.
Hence, E∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
5.3.2 SIRV model with imperfect vaccine
When 0 < σ < 1, the vaccine only provides partial immunity to vaccinated
individuals and we shall analyse system (5.1). The DFE of system (5.1) is
the same as E0 but the effective reproduction number is given by










φ [s e−d er cv ] + µ
)
, (5.14)
where (5.14) reduces to (5.9) whenever σ = 0.
Similar to Theorem 5.1, it is easy to show system (5.1) has stable DFE if
Reff < 1.
Theorem 5.3. The disease free equilibrium of system (5.1) is locally asymp-
totically stable if Reff < 1 and unstable if Reff > 1.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of system (5.1) at DFE E0 is given by
−φ g0 − µ −{1 + rd er cv (1− σ)φ g0} β S0 0 0
0 β(S0 + σV0)− γ − µ 0 0
0 γ −µ 0
φ g0 −σβ V0 + rd er cv (1− σ)φ g0 β S0 0 −µ
 , (5.15)
where g0 = s e
−d er cv > 0. The eigenvalues of the matrix (5.15) are given by
η1 = η2 = −µ, η3 = −φ g0−µ and η4 = β(S0 +σV0)− γ−µ. If Reff < 1, then
λ4 < 0 and all the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix (5.15) are negative. Hence,
E0 is locally asymptotically stable.
In epidemic models with perfect vaccine and constant vaccination rate,
forward bifurcation takes place at reproduction number equal to unity. How-
ever, imperfect vaccine has been identified as one of the causes of backward
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bifurcation [44], that is the existence of multiple endemic equilibria when Reff
is less than and close to unity. The infectious disease is much more difficult
to be eliminated by vaccination if the phenomenon of backward bifurcation
occurs [52]. Hence, we use the center manifold theorem in [14] to determine
the type of transcritical bifurcation at Reff = 1.
For this purpose, we introduce the notations x1 ≡ S, x2 ≡ I, x3 ≡ R,
x4 ≡ V and N =
∑4




f = [f1, f2, f3, f4]
T with





x1 − µx1, (5.16a)
f2 = λ(x1 + σx4)− γx2 − µx2, (5.16b)






x1 − σλx4 − µx4, (5.16d)
where λ = β µx2
Λ
at an equilibrium point.
The DFE corresponds to x0 = (x10, x20, x30, x40) = (S0, 0, 0, V0). Taking β
as bifurcation parameter, at Reff = 1, the critical value of β is β∗ = γ+µS0+σV0 .
The linearization matrix of (5.16) at x0 has the same eigenvalues as those given
in Theorem 5.3. It is clear that the eigenvalue η4 in Theorem 5.3 becomes zero
when β = β∗. The left eigenvector associated with the zero eigenvalue is v =


















in which q = (σφ g0 + µ)(φ g0 + µ) and v ·w = 1.
Since only the second component of v is non-zero, we calculate the second

















and all other derivatives are zero. We then determine the direction of trans-































µ2(1− σ)2rd er cvφ g0 + q1
]
< 0, (5.19)
where q1 = σ
2φ g0(φ g0+µ)+µ(σφ g0+µ). Since a < 0 and together with b > 0,
we conclude that forward bifurcation occurs at Reff = 1. We rule out the pos-
sibility of backward bifurcation in system (5.1) with partial vaccine-induced
immunity in the scenario whereby individuals use a simple cost-benefit anal-
ysis in voluntary decision-making.
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(a) Logistic: β = 0.625, γ = 0.25, cv = 0.2































(b) Gompertz: Same as (a)































(c) Logistic: β = 1, γ = 0.125, cv = 4































(d) Gompertz: Same as (c)
Figure 5.3: Time evolution of SIRV dynamics with perfect vaccine model
whereby the vaccination rate is governed by logistic and Gompertz smoothed
best response functions.
5.4 Results and discussion
5.4.1 SIRV dynamics with perfect vaccine
Unless other specified, the set of parameter values (β, γ,Λ, µ, cv, φ, s, d, r) =
(0.625, 0.25, 0.05, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 1,−ln(0.5), 1) is used for all simulations in this
chapter, together with initial conditions S(0) = 0.95, I(0) = 0.05. We first
simulate the SIRV dynamics with perfect vaccine (σ = 0) with two types
of smoothed best response functions, namely logistic and Gompertz func-
tions, by using r = 0.5 in Figure 5.3. As for the logistic smoothed best
response dynamics, we simply replace G(4P ) in system (5.7) with L(4P ) in
115
(5.6a) and its corresponding control reproduction number is calculated using
RC = R0 µφ(1+er cv )−1+µ . We find that both logistic and Gompertz functions
give very similar epidemic dynamics and vaccination coverage throughout the
simulation time (Figure 5.3(a) and 5.3(b)) when the risk of disease spread-
ing is intermediate (R0 = 2.0833) and the low cost of vaccination (cv = 0.2)
is considered. The epidemics die out as the control reproduction numbers
(RC = 0.7184 for logistic and RC = 0.7286 for Gompertz) are less than unity.
However, when the basic reproduction number (R0 = 5.7143) and the cost
of vaccination (cv = 4) are both relatively high, it is found that the vaccination
uptake level resulting from both functions are significantly different (Figure
5.3(c) and 5.3(d)). The logistic smoothed best response still yields significant
vaccine uptake levels whereas the Gompertz function does not. It seems pos-
sible that this discrepancy is due to the asymmetry property of Gompertz
function. When the cost of vaccination is higher than the benefit of getting
vaccination (i.e. the net payoff is negative, 4P < 0), the probability of taking
vaccination drops more steeply in the Gompertz function model compared to
that using the logistic function. This distinction between the Gompertz and
logistic function models is more pronounced when individuals are not very
responsive to payoff difference, for instance when r = 0.5, as can be seen in
Figure 5.1(a). This result is in agreement with the finding in [117]. We thus
claim that whenever individuals are more sensitive to negative net payoff in
asymmetric vaccination strategy, individuals are said to be risk-averse. The
disease may be more difficult to be controlled by voluntary vaccination with
asymmetric smoothed best response when the cost of vaccination is very high.
We next examine the impact of parameters s, d, r in the Gompertz func-
tion (5.4) and the vaccination effort parameter φ on the disease equilibrium
point of the SIRV model with perfect vaccine (5.7) in Figure 5.4. The simula-
tions end at t = 100 unit time with 4t = 1. As we assume that s is less than
unity to reflect the scenarios whereby a certain proportion (i.e. (1−s)100%) of
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(a) For s ∈ (0.8, 1)































(b) d = −ln(d0), where 0.1 ≤ d0 ≤ 0.8





























(c) 0 < r ≤ 20































(d) 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
Figure 5.4: The impact of parameter s, d, r and φ on the equilibrium of SIRV
perfect vaccine model with Gompertz smoothed best response function.
the individuals in population are vaccine refusers, we find that an increase of
proportion of vaccine refusers does not substantially influence the vaccine up-
take level (Figure 5.4(a)), as compared to other parameters being investigated
in Figure 5.4. A possible explanation for this might be that our modelling
framework assumes not all susceptibles taking the effort to rely on the cost-
benefit analysis in deciding whether or not to vaccinate at each time step, as
the vaccination effort parameter used here is relatively small (φ = 0.2).
The impacts of parameters d and φ on disease equilibrium structure and
vaccine uptake level, albeit not exactly in the same way, do have some sim-
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(a) 0 ≤ cv ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.4 (b) 0.001 ≤ r ≤ 6 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.4
(c) 0.1 ≤ d0 ≤ 0.8, where d = −ln(d0) and
0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.6
(d) 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.6
Figure 5.5: The parameter-space {cv, r, d, φ} − σ diagrams for the effective
reproduction numberReff of the SIRV imperfect vaccine model with the Gom-
pertz smoothed best response function.
ilarities. As we have d = −ln(d0), it is indeed d0, not d, that represents
the probability of individuals choosing vaccination strategy when the payoff
difference 4P = 0, and we also observe that the disease with R0 = 2.0833
is under controlled only when d0 is not too small (Figure 5.4(b)). Similar
observation is obtained in Figure 5.4(d) in which disease is being eradicated
only when the vaccination effort parameter φ is greater than 0.15. Indeed,
no one takes vaccination if φ = 0. The results in Figure 5.4(d) are consistent
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with the one obtained by using the logistic smoothed best response function
in [116]. With the combination parameter values used in Figure 5.4, it can
thus be suggested that a small increment in φ, when its value is still low, may
lead to a sharply increase in vaccine uptake level. On the other hand, the in-
creases produced by increments in d0, despite significant, however, are not as
encouraging as those produced by φ. Similar to the finding in [116] for logistic
smoothed best response function, the increases of individuals’ responsiveness
to payoff difference, r, would cause the vaccine uptake level to decrease when
the Gompertz function is used (Figure 5.4(c)).
5.4.2 SIRV dynamics with imperfect vaccine
For the SIRV model with imperfect vaccine, equation (5.2) implies that the
higher the probability of vaccine failure σ, the lower payoff benefit in choosing
vaccination strategy. We expect the vaccine uptake level would be lower and
the disease spreading would be more severe than the case of perfect vaccine.
Hence, we study how the probability of vaccine failure σ influences the dy-
namical behaviour of the system numerically by presenting the changes of the
effective reproduction number Reff for various parameter-space in Figure 5.5.
The solid curves in all panels denote the points where both parameter values
give Reff = 1. For the combination parameter values used, we find that an
increase of the cost of vaccination, cv, or the individual responsiveness to pay-
off difference, r, would cause the epidemic outbreak even worse with reduced
vaccine efficacy (Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b)). However, it is interesting to find
that increasing the probability of choosing vaccination strategy when4P = 0
or increasing the vaccination effort parameter φ may offset the negative effect
of increasing σ in our SIRV model with Gompertz smoothed best response in
the vaccination decision making.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
We propose the Gompertz-type asymmetric smoothed best response function
in modelling the voluntary vaccination strategy of each individual based on a
cost-benefit analysis in an epidemic model with perfect and partial vaccine-
induced immunity. For the case of perfect vaccine, we prove that the disease
free equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable when the control reproduction
number is less than unity. We show that the endemic equilibrium exists and
is unique if the control reproduction number is greater than unity through
qualitative analysis. The endemic equilibrium, if it exists, is locally asymp-
totically stable. For the case of imperfect vaccine, the forward bifurcation
occurs when the effective reproduction number is unity.
We conclude this chapter with the following remarks.
(i) The Gompertz smoothed best response gives the similar epidemic dy-
namics and vaccine uptake level as the logistic function when the risk of
disease spreading is intermediate and the cost of vaccination is low, but it
diverges from logistic function when the cost of vaccination is relatively
high. The asymmetry property of the Gompert function is a major fac-
tor that gives rise to this discrepancy. This suggests that the Gompertz
function may be suitable in modelling the nature of risk-averse individ-
uals who are usually more careful in accepting vaccination but refuse to
vaccinate when the cost is only marginally higher than its benefit.
(ii) An increase of vaccination effort and the probability of taking vaccina-
tion when the cost and benefit are perceived to be the same would be
beneficial to disease control through voluntary vaccination, whereas the
greater responsiveness of individuals to the payoff difference would reduce
the vaccine uptake level.
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(iii) When vaccine efficacy decreases, increasing the probability of choosing
vaccination strategy when the cost equals the benefit and/or increasing




Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary of the research
This thesis focuses on modelling the self-initiated health protective behavioural
change and the vaccination behaviour in the course of epidemic outbreaks.
Within the game theoretical modelling framework, we model the former be-
havioural change by using two-subpopulation replicator dynamical equations
whereas the latter through the following two ways. First, an utility function
in terms of both individual- and population-scale vaccination rate are used
to express the preference of individuals opting for vaccination, in the vacci-
nation population game framework. Second, the asymmetric smoothed best
response dynamics is described in Gompertz function for individuals’ vacci-
nation decision-making in an epidemic model with the prevalence-dependent
vaccination rate.
All the approaches share a few common features. First, individuals are
modelled as making use of the cost-benefit considerations in their behavioural
changes. That is, upon receiving the disease prevalence information, they
weigh the perceived benefits and costs of adopting certain strategy. This is
indeed the most essence part of disease-behaviour models with game theory
components where the strategy adoption is payoff-driven. Second, all the
models assume that the disease information is available to the individuals in
the population which is unavoidably unrealistic but to keep the models as
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simple as possible. On the other hand, the ratio of the cost of behavioural
change (i.e. adopting vaccination strategy) to the cost of disease is used in
the framework of vaccination population game in Chapter Four. This implies
that the perceived cost of the behavioural change would never be greater than
the perceived cost of disease itself. Meanwhile, this normalization does not
appear in the frameworks used in Chapter Three and Five, which means that
the perceived cost of behavioural changes could be higher than its perceived
benefit.
For modelling the self-initiated health protective behavioural changes in
Chapter Three, we find that without imitations, the natural selection drives
only a small number of susceptibles to switch their strategy. With imitation
process, the strategies distribution will depend on the initial proportion of
susceptible with normal and altered strategies in both subpopulations, the
magnitude of the social group pressure and the amount of extra profit given
to susceptible adopting the preferred behaviour in respective subpopulation.
This in a way reflects the influence of the existing preference, the conformity
of the coordinated behaviour and the rewards (or punishments) in shaping
the imitation dynamics and hence the epidemic dynamics. It is interesting
to find that the social group pressure could be a “double-edged sword” in
promoting the adoption of the pre-cautionary health protective behaviour.
Although the mean-field model is used, the heterogeneity of groups is being
investigated in terms of different relative strengths and different preferences
of subpopulations. It is found that all these factors give rise to rich dynamics
of imitations and epidemics.
In Chapter Four, we look into the impact of three additional character-
istics of imperfect vaccine in a two-class vaccine-induced immunity model
on the vaccination behaviour with the vaccination population game frame-
work. Intuitively, rational individuals would opt for vaccination if vaccines
are able to provide longer duration of high immunity to vaccinated people.
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When vaccine is not effective in reducing the susceptibility of the vaccinated
individuals, the greater reduction of infectivity to vaccinated infected indi-
viduals would be beneficial in circumventing the persistence of disease even
instant vaccination is achieved. However, it is somewhat surprising that the
scale of this reduction of transmissibility does not affect the cost threshold
for no vaccination. In addition, without faster recovery in breakthrough in-
fection, the self-interested individuals are highly likely to refuse vaccination
when the vaccine efficacy is low. As the imperfect vaccine gives rise to the
phenomenon of backward bifurcation, the vaccination population game with
three additional characteristics of imperfect vaccine also results in multiple
Nash equilibria vaccination rates which complicates the disease control efforts.
The Gompertz-type of the asymmetrically smoothed best response func-
tion is proposed in modelling the individuals’ voluntary vaccination strategy
based on a simple cost-benefit consideration in epidemic model with perfect
and partial vaccine-induced immunity in Chapter Five. We find that an in-
crease of vaccination effort and the probability of taking vaccination when the
cost and benefit are perceived to be the same would be beneficial to disease
control through voluntary vaccination, whereas the greater responsiveness of
individuals to the payoff difference would reduce the vaccination rate. An-
other important finding is that the asymmetric property of the smoothed best
response produces a different vaccine uptake level from the symmetric one in
an otherwise similar pattern when the cost of vaccination is perceived to be
very high. This reflects that the risk-averse individuals have a more down-
ward inclination to vaccination than the rational people in general. Contrary
to expectations, the study in this chapter did not find any significant differ-
ence between the vaccination strategy adoptions for vaccine that offers full
and partial protection to vaccinated individuals. However, a note of caution
is due here since it is simply that the probability of vaccine failure is being
modelled as a factor in reducing the perceived benefit of getting vaccination.
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6.2 Future works
The average reduction of force of infection for behavioural changes involving
the self-initiated pre-cautionary health protective actions in Chapter Three
takes a pre-defined reduction factor multiplied with the prevalence-based
strategy frequencies of susceptibles in the population. This leads to a smoothed
game dynamics which implies that people start to have strategy interactions
(and hence possibly alter their behaviours) as long as there are some disease
incidences in the population. This smoothed and continuous modelling frame-
work, despite giving promising results on the coupled imitation and epidemic
dynamics, does not reflect the more realistic scenarios. For instance, the pre-
cautionary measures which are usually triggered once the number of infected
individuals exceeds a threshold level [115] and/or the information on the dis-
ease outbreak would only be covered in media when the number of infected
cases reaches some critical number [107]. In reality, not only control measures
imposed by public health authorities or pscyhological effects induced by media
coverage on disease outbreaks would result in non-smoothed (i.e. piecewise
continuous) transmission rate [106], game-theoretical approaches of individ-
uals’ self-initiated pre-cautionary health protective behaviours might also be
developed in a modelling framework of non-smoothed dynamical systems in
further investigations, so as to reflect the nature of people who only consider
strategy switching once the disease prevalence reaches a certain threshold.
Despite the promising results obtained in investigating the impact of im-
perfect vaccine in the framework of vaccination population game in Chapter
Four, there are still many unanswered questions about the optimal vaccina-
tion policy even when the vaccine is assumed to be perfect. The recent works
in this respect including the formulation of a policy problem as an optimal
control problem [53]. On the other domain, the relationships between the indi-
vidual investments in pre-cautionary health protective actions and the public
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health policies are investigated in [55]. These indicate that further studies,
which take into account of the policy aspects, will need to be undertaken in
modelling human behaviour in disease spreading so as to provide more mean-
ingful insights and guides, especially to public health policy makers, in the
effort of combating the infectious diseases.
As the disease prevalence-based of continuous vaccination with the asym-
metrically smoothed best response function is developed in Chapter Five with
the aims to provide a corresponding mean-field version of model to the agent-
based simulation framework with Fermi strategy updating rule, in which the
simulation framework models a repeated vaccination decision-making before
each of the epidemic season. While the framework in Chapter Five does not
take into account of seasonality, further studies, which take into account of
seasonal force [28], will need to be undertaken in order to better explain the
nature of risk-averse individuals in vaccination decision-making for influenza.
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[97] G. Szabó and G. Fath. Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics Reports,
446(4):97–216, 2007.
[98] J. K. Taubenberger and D. M. Morens. 1918 influenza: the mother of
all pandemics. Rev. Biomed., 17:69–79, 2006.
[99] P. D. Taylor. Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player.
Journal of Applied Probability, pages 76–83, 1979.
137
[100] P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker. Evolutionary stable strategies and game
dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences, 40(1-2):145–156, 1978.
[101] Y. Tsutsui, U. Benzion, and S. Shahrabani. Economic and behavioral
factors in an individual’s decision to take the influenza vaccination in
Japan. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 41(5):594–602, 2012.
[102] S. Tully, M. Cojocaru, and C. T. Bauch. Coevolution of risk percep-
tion, sexual behaviour, and HIV transmission in an agent-based model.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 337:125–132, 2013.
[103] P. Van den Driessche and J. Watmough. Further notes on the basic
reproduction number. In Mathematical Epidemiology, pages 159–178.
Springer, 2008.
[104] R. Vardavas, R. Breban, and S. Blower. Can influenza epidemics be
prevented by voluntary vaccination? PLoS Comput. Biol., 3(5):e85,
2007.
[105] R. Vardavas, R. Breban, and S. Blower. A universal long-term flu vac-
cine may not prevent severe epidemics. BMC Research Notes, 3(1):92,
2010.
[106] A. Wang and Y. Xiao. A Filippov system describing media effects on
the spread of infectious diseases. Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems,
11:84–97, 2014.
[107] L. Wang, D. Zhou, Z. Liu, D. Xu, and X. Zhang. Media alert in an SIS
epidemic model with logistic growth. Journal of Biological Dynamics,
pages 1–18, 2016.
[108] I. M. Wangari, S. Davis, and L. Stone. Backward bifurcation in epidemic
models: Problems arising with aggregated bifurcation parameters. Ap-
plied Mathematical Modelling, 40(2):1669–1675, 2016.
138
[109] G. A. Weinberg and P. G. Szilagyi. Vaccine epidemiology: efficacy, effec-
tiveness, and the translational research roadmap. Journal of Infectious
Diseases, 201(11):1607–1610, 2010.
[110] C. Wells and C. Bauch. The impact of personal experiences with in-
fection and vaccination on behaviour–incidence dynamics of seasonal
influenza. Epidemics, 4(3):139–151, 2012.
[111] A. Wheelock, M. Miraldo, A. Parand, C. Vincent, and N. Sevdalis.
Journey to vaccination: a protocol for a multinational qualitative study.
BMJ Open, 4(1):e004279, 2014.
[112] (WHO). Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1
November 2002 to 31 July 2003 (based on data as of the 31 December
2003). http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004-04-21/en.html.
Accessed: 2016-11-03.
[113] B. Wu, F. Fu, and L. Wang. Imperfect vaccine aggravates the long-
standing dilemma of voluntary vaccination. PLoS ONE, 6(6):e20577,
2011.
[114] S. Xia and J. Liu. A computational approach to characterizing the
impact of social influence on individuals vaccination decision making.
PLoS ONE, 8(4):e60373, 2013.
[115] Y. Xiao, X. Xu, and S. Tang. Sliding mode control of outbreaks
of emerging infectious diseases. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology,
74(10):2403–2422, 2012.
[116] F. Xu and R. Cressman. Disease control through voluntary vaccination
decisions based on the smoothed best response. Computational and
Mathematical Methods in Medicine, 2014:ID 825734, 2014.
[117] F. Xu and R. Cressman. Voluntary vaccination strategy and the spread
of sexually transmitted diseases. Mathematical Biosciences, 274:94–107,
2016.
139
[118] H. Zhang, F. Fu, W. Zhang, and B. Wang. Rational behavior is a
“double-edged sword” when considering voluntary vaccination. Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 391(20):4807–4815, 2012.
[119] H. Zhang, J. Zhang, P. Li, M. Small, and B. Wang. Risk estimation of
infectious diseases determines the effectiveness of the control strategy.
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 240(11):943–948, 2011.
[120] H.-F. Zhang, Z.-X. Wu, M. Tang, and Y.-C. Lai. Effects of behavioral re-
sponse and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading-an approach based
on evolutionary-game dynamics. Scientific Reports, 4, 2014.
[121] H.-F. Zhang, Z.-X. Wu, X.-K. Xu, M. Small, L. Wang, and B.-H. Wang.
Impacts of subsidy policies on vaccination decisions in contact networks.
Physical Review E, 88(1):012813, 2013.
[122] Y. Zhang. The impact of other-regarding tendencies on the spatial
vaccination game. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 56:209–215, 2013.
[123] X. Zhou, X. Shi, and H. Cheng. Modelling and stability analysis for
a tuberculosis model with healthy education and treatment. Computa-
tional and Applied Mathematics, 32(2):245–260, 2013.
“Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright
material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been





Following [47, 48], for two subpopulations, the set of mutual-coupled game-
dynamical replicator equations is given by
dpai (t)
dt
= pai (t)κ [E
a
i (t)− Aa(t)] . (1)
The superscripts a, b ∈ {1, 2} denote different subpopulations, subscripts
i, j ∈ {1, 2} denote different behaviours (or strategies), the “expected suc-








j(t) for the fraction of individuals belonging
to subpopulation a, fa ≥ 0, with
∑
a fa = 1, and the proportion of individuals













Equation (1) differs from the one stated in [48] in which the parameter
κ is added to model the imitation dynamics under the influence of epidemic
dynamics. In this situation, the strategies or behaviours spread proportion-
ally to their success, but not inherited. In the language of evolutionary game
theory, κ is a proportionality constant denoting how willing the players are
to switch to new strategy based on the payoff difference.
Following notations in equation (1), the game-dynamical equation for
strategy i = 1 in subpopulation a = 1 is derived as follows:
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Table 1: The payoff matrices for two-subpopulation asymmetric game
The payoff matrix for individuals belonging to subpopulation 1
(i) A11ij , within-subpopulation interactions (ii) A
12
ij , between-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal j = 1∗ j = 2 Focal j = 1 j = 2∗
agent’s i = 1∗ r1 s1 agent’s i = 1
∗ R1 S1
behaviour i = 2 t1 p1 behaviour i = 2 T1 P1
The payoff matrix for individuals belonging to subpopulation 2
(i) A22ij , within-subpopulation interactions (ii) A
21
ij , between-subpopulation interactions
Interaction partner’s behaviour Interaction partner’s behaviour
Focal j = 1 j = 2∗ Focal j = 1∗ j = 2
agent’s i = 1 p2 t2 agent’s i = 1 P2 T2
behaviour i = 2∗ s2 r2 behaviour i = 2
∗ S2 R2

























1(t) + (1− p11(t))E12(t)
}]





Let p11(t) = p(t) be the proportion of individuals with the (preferred)









Similarly, the game-dynamical equation for strategy j = 2 in subpopulation
b = 2 is given by
dq(t)
dt





In their multi-population game-dynamical replicator equations, Helbing
and Johannson [47, 48] derived the expected success of strategy interactions
from the 2 × 2 payoff matrices for two-subpopulation asymmetric game, as
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given in Table 1. In classical game theory, the notations in the elements of
matrices in Table 1 are associated to r (reward), s (sucker’s payoff), t (temp-
tation), and p (punishment). Notice that the payoffs for within-subpopulation
interactions are denoted by lowercase letters r, s, p, and t, whereas upper-
case letters R, S, P and T are used for payoffs for between-subpopulation
interactions. To reflect incompatible preferences of two subpopulations, the
payoff matrix of individuals belonging to subpopulation 2 is assumed to be
“inverted” or “mirrored” of the payoff matrix of individuals in subpopulation
1 [47], and vice versa. However, in the context of adopting normal or altered
strategies in the course of epidemic outbreak in Chapter Three, the issue is
always whether one will be beneficial or not from adopting certain strategy.
Hence, the r, s, p, and t (resp. R, S, P , and T ) in the formulations in Chap-
ter Three are simply variables used to denote the payoff value received by
individuals (or agents) in the pairwise strategy interactions.
By using the payoff matrices of A11ij and A
12




















equation (2a), after some algebra, we obtain the game-dynamical equation
for subpopulation 1, as follows:
dp(t)
dt
= κ p(t) (1− p(t))
[
(r1 − t1)fp(t) + (s1 − p1)f(1− p(t))
+ (R1 − T1)(1− f)(1− q(t)) + (S1 − P1)(1− f)q(t)
]
. (3a)
Similarly, the game-dynamical equation for subpopulation 2 is
dq(t)
dt
= κ q(t) (1− q(t))
[
(S2 − P2)fp(t) + (R2 − T2)f(1− p(t))
+ (s2 − p2)(1− f)(1− q(t)) + (r2 − t2)(1− f)q(t)
]
. (3b)
The system of equations (3) consists of 16 payoff-dependent model param-
eters. They could be reduced for simplicity through several ways. Following





= κ p(t) (1− p(t))
[






= κ q(t) (1− q(t))
[




The system (4) has 8 payoff-dependent model parameters.
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Appendix B: The derivation of
the effective reproduction
number by using the next
generation matrix
We first find the effective reproduction number (4.3) for system (4.1) by using
the procedure in Section 2.3, as follows.
Step 1: Let I and W be the disease compartments, we have
F =




 , V =
 (γu + µ)I
(γv + µ)W
 .
Step 2: Find the linearization of the relevant rate equations in Step 1 at DFE,
F =





 , V =
γu + µ 0
0 γv + µ
 ,
and the next generation matrix is given by
K = FV−1 =




















The expression (5) could be interpreted as the sum of the number of sec-
ondary infection of unvaccinated susceptible individuals produced by a pri-
mary infected person in the I class and the number of secondary infections of
vaccinated susceptible individuals produced by a primary infected person in
the W class. As the primary infected person (also known as the “index case”,
or “patient zero”, in epidemiology) could be simply referred to as the first
individual in the population showing the symptoms of the infectious disease,
the existing of two primary infection cases in the above interpretation may
be misleading. Also, this interpretation rules out the possibility of disease
transmission from individuals in the I (resp. W ) class to individuals in the V2
(resp. S) class, which the number of infections is not insignificant. Therefore,
it is necessary to adopt different notations (and hence different interpreta-
tions) to deal with the reproduction number involving more than one class of
infected and/or susceptible individuals.
Following [103], we denote β ≡ βuu, βθ ≡ βuv, σβ ≡ βvu and σβθ ≡ βvv,
then the next generation matrix in Step 2 above becomes
K =





















(Ruu +Rvv)2 − 4RuuRvv + 4RuvRvu. (7)
It follows that the disease eradication threshold condition Rvac < 1 is now




Ruu +Rvv −RuuRvv +RuvRvu <1.
Hence, following [103], we shall interpret the reproduction number Rvac as the
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number of secondary infections, both vaccinated and unvaccinated, produced
by an index case distributed in both disease compartments, with one part in
the I class and σ V20
S0
parts in the W class.
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